Posts Tagged ‘globalisation’

EFP Brief No. 255: RIF Research & Innovation Futures

Wednesday, February 20th, 2013

RIF explores possible future ways of doing and organising research in order to inspire fresh thinking among research stakeholders about underlying potentials and looming risks in the present.

Drivers for New Ways of Doing Research

RIF was setting out from the observation that current ways of doing and organising research are experiencing a number of new phenomena, challenges and tensions such as:

  • Increasing demand for public participation in defining research priorities
  • Demand for early economic exploitation of research findings and subsequent protection of intellectual property right
  • Increasing call for creation of socially robust knowledge
  • Emergence of diversity of knowledge claims challenging the monopoly of “science” such as the Rise of citizens scientists
  • New technologies changing science practises such as big data, computer simulation, researcher social networks and e-publishing
  • Call for open access to research findings
  • Established publishing modes challenged by new players
  • Institutional diversification and change of established division of roles
  • Increasing engagement of industry in research activities
  • Turn in Research and Innovation Policy towards mission oriented strategies
  • Established notions of science excellence being contested
  • Increasing relevance of large technical infrastructures
  • Change in the global landscape of research, emergence of new countries leading publications

Tackling Tensions of Future Research Governance

In view of this background the RIF Foresight exercise defined the following objectives:

  • Systematize knowledge of the emerging patterns, trends and drivers of change of ways of doing and organising research.
  • Develop medium-term explorative scenarios of possible future models of doing and organising research in our knowledge societies at a time horizon 2020
  • Anticipate and assess possible challenges and tensions resulting from these scenarios
  • Develop long-term transformative scenarios of alternative development paths of the way we will do and organize research and innovation in our societies at a time horizon of about 2030
  • Identify policy issues and strategic options for the actors and stakeholders affected, as resulting from the two types of scenarios
  • Create an open debate between different communities contributing to knowledge dynamics from their respective perspectives and explore room for joint action.

Explorative and Transformative Scenarios

The core element of the RIF methodology is a two stage scenario process as shown in figure 1.

bild1

In a first stage the RIF team identified current trends and drivers of research practices and organisation through an in-depth stocktaking of literature, forward looking studies and strategy documents (Schaper-Rinkel et al. 2012). In a next step RIF set up a scenario process involving around 70 stakeholders with a wide range of backgrounds and perspectives within three interactive scenario workshops:

In the first workshop participants developed “explorative scenarios” with a mid-term time horizon by extrapolating today’s trends and drivers (c.f. RIF 2012). Out of these explorative scenarios they identified a set of tensions, junctures and dilemmas that could be emerging in the mid-term if current dynamics continue (c.f. figure 2).

The explorative scenario workshop comprised the following interactive methods:

 

  • plenary discussion and multi-criteria assessment for the selection of core trends
  • facilitated group brainstorming for projection of the selected factors into the mid-term future
  • open-space session for the final identification of tensions (c.f. figure 2)
  • self-organised group work for elaboration of the tensions

bild2

In the second transformative scenario workshop the RIF team and a few selected external participants with a background in the most relevant issues brought forward by the preceding workshop developed the “nuclei of change” from the previous workshop into draft transformative scenarios within plenary and group brainstorming sessions.

The third scenario workshop was dedicated to validation and enrichment of the transformative scenario drafts. A world café format enabled a constructive and structured futures’ dialogue:

On each world café table the team had placed a characteristic image and short descriptive paragraph for one transformative scenario draft. In group sessions of ca. half an hour participants commented on the drafts and enriched the scenarios. Several rounds were carried out so each participant was able to comment on at least two scenarios. One table had been reserved in case participants proposed additional scenarios, which was indeed the case when an entirely new wild card scenario was proposed by one of the participants.

In the second session participants relating to the four stakeholder groups science, policy, civil society and industry worked in separate groups. In a first step they defined their core strategic objectives with respect to research. Secondly, they assessed opportunities and threats for these targets for all six scenarios.

The RIF project has now arrived at the midterm of its duration. The next two workpackages will be dedicated to stakeholder debate on policy implications and strategic options emerging from the scenarios. For this purpose several participatory foresight workshops will be held. Some of these strategic conversations will be crosscutting while others will address specific stakeholder groups that are facing particularly relevant strategic issues according to the scenario analysis.

Broad Stakeholder Participation

The RIF team selected the participants of the Foresight exercise on the basis of a stakeholder analysis using (among others) the stakeholder classification scheme developed by Mitchell et al (1997). Representatives from the following institutional backgrounds participated in the workshops:

 

  • University based researchers (Professors, PhDs, students)
  • University administration
  • Research funding agencies
  • Foundations active in research funding
  • Regional policy agencies
  • Public research organisations
  • Research Ministries (national and EU level)
  • Large companies
  • SMEs
  • Science shops
  • Citzens’ science activists
  • Scientific journal editors
  • Science quality control agencies
  • Industrial associations
  • Trade unions
  • Health organisations
  • International researcher networks
  • Large research infrastructures

 

The majority of the participants came from different European countries representing some organisations from regional, national and European level but also from other continents and international organisations. RIF achieved a good balance between female and male participants.

From Slow Science to Competition 2.0

The RIF project is still on-going. Currently, the scenario report containing the explorative and transformative scenarios emerging from the stakeholder process is being finalised. The insights generated by the stocktaking and draft scenario building are available and summarised below.

The stocktaking (Schaper-Rinkel et al. 2012) pointed out six core dimensions of change in ways of doing and organising research:

  • Digitalization and virtualisation
  • Cooperation & Participation
  • Access
  • Impact
  • Globalisation & Internationalisation

Within these dimensions the analysis revealed the following tensions:

  • open science versus commodification of research
  • short-term project-orientation versus long-term development of new forms of research
  • abundance of scientific information versus shortage of individually manageable and reliable information
  • research collaboration versus competition for research funding
  • collaborative research versus individual incentives
  • diversity in research versus quality standards
  • scientific excellence that is associated with value-free, curiosity-driven research versus research that is relevant to contributing to societal needs
  • diversity versus uniformity
  • research efficiency versus foundational breakthroughs
  • diverse epistemic cultures in providing knowledge for decision-making

The foresight process outlined above generated seven transformative scenario drafts within the first two workshops:

Scenario I: Open Research Landscape

European research is coordinated by “Open Research Platforms (ORP)” where different types of globally connected actors align their funding activities. Each ORP runs an open knowledge sharing WIKI platform where researchers integrate their findings. The new gate-keepers of scientific quality are science & society social networks. University performance is judged by their contribution to the ORPs success.

Scenario II Divided Science Kingdom

The research landscape is divided between two extremes: strictly governed publicly-funded research applying traditional quality criteria versus an open “knowledge parliament” where knowledge claims and funding opportunities are continuously negotiated. Universities are highly diversified according to the two realms

Scenario III: Grand Challenges for real

European research and innovation is strictly organized around Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) that develop solutions for key societal challenges through large scale socio-technical research and experimentation aligning diverse actors and knowledge types. Large shares of public budgets are used to finance the KICs in a coordinated manner. This happens in a period of reduced economic growth in Europe, where higher priority is given to other dimensions of quality of life.

Scenario IV: Tailored Research

The research landscape is coordinated through a fully tailored system of functions fulfilled by highly specialised actors that share revenues according to market rules. At the top of the pyramid, Research Assembling Organisations (RAOs) integrate the contributions of second and third tier research service providers into systemic solutions. A few actors define the rules of interaction and control access to research results and resources. Science is viewed as one of the key enablers for winning the global competition race.

Scenario V: Slow Science

A dedicated group of scientists, also known as “slow science community”, is orienting re-search towards societal and policy needs and placing high emphasis on work-life balance and on making the results of their research work effective in practice. The community is locally rooted, globally connected and funded by bottom-up crowd-funding from diverse sources.

Scenario VI: Competition 2.0 – European public research divided

Driven by business pressure, the Europe’s emphasis is on innovation-oriented research with a focus on improving mid-term global competitiveness. Independent basic research has almost vanished and struggles for funding from public sources.

Scenario X Happiness 2030

To reach the ambitious requirements of wellbeing and happiness until 2030, by 2020 a fully distributed research system based on virtual open science communities, micro-funding and real science markets emerges. Virtual communities grow stronger due to shared methods and processes, affordable tools and applications, as well as to ambitious young talents working and striving for societal reputation. Social science entrepreneurs are climbing up the ladder of success and foster bottom‑up innovation.

These scenario drafts are now being consolidated on the basis of the input from the third workshop which is documented in RIF 2012. The full scenario report will be available soon after.

Changing Value System in Research & Innovation

It is too early yet to draw definite conclusions and policy implications from the RIF foresight exercise. Already now it becomes clear however that longstanding certainties are becoming volatile and the future of research will pose major challenges to decision makers on all levels and institutional backgrounds. The lively debates around the “policy table” in the Vienna world cafe on pros and cons of the various scenarios revealed several valuable strategic questions for policy making today. Accordingly we expect the emergence of a number of relevant policy implications from the strategic debate within the two next work packages:

  • Scenario implication assessment (WP3)
  • Strategic options for society and policy (WP4).

The scenario report will present a consolidated version of the scenarios based on the inputs from the third workshop.

Authors: Philine Warnke                         philine.warnke@ait.ac.at
Sponsors: European Commission DG RTD Science in Society
Type: European level  thematic exercise
Organizer: Matthias Weber, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, and matthias.weber@ait.ac.at
Duration: 2011-2013
Budget: € 860 ,000
Time Horizon: 2020/2030
Date of Brief: January 2013

Download EFP Brief 255_RIF Research and Innovation Futures

Sources and References

More information on the RIF project including all reports for download can be found at: http://www.rif2030.eu/

Amanatidou, E., Cox, D., Saritas, O. (2012): RIF Deliverable 4.1: Stakeholders in the STI System.

Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R. and Wood, D. J. (1997), ‘Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts’, The Academy of Management Review, 22 (4), 853–886.

Schaper-Rinkel, P., Weber, M., Wasserbacher, D., van Oost, E., Ordonez-Matamores, G., Krooi, M., Hölsgens, R. Nieminen, M., Peltonen, A. 2012: RIF Deliverable 1.1 Stocktaking Report.

RIF 2012: Research in Europe 2030: Documentation of the RIF Vienna World Café. http://www.rif2030.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/RIF-Docu-World-cafe-Vienna_final.pdf

(Links for further information, references used, etc.)

EFP Brief No. 251: VERA – Forward Visions on the European Research Area

Wednesday, February 13th, 2013

The VERA project provides relevant strategic intelligence for the future governance and priority-setting of the research, technology, development and innovation (RTDI) system in the EU and for better adapting science, technology and inno-vation policy to the shifting global environment and upcoming socio-economic challenges. For this purpose VERA carries out an in-depth stocktaking of RTDI related forward looking activities in Europe and internationally and a thorough review of trends and drivers of long-term change of European RTDI governance. On the base of these insights VERA develops scenarios on the evolution of the European Research Area, assesses the critical issues for the ERA’s future capabilities emerging from these scenarios, explores subsequent strategic options and ultimately generates a set of policy recommendations for responsive and future oriented multi-level, multi-domain RTDI policy strategies. As VERA will run until 2014 we will present some intermediary results of the first two work packages in this Brief.

Changes and Tensions within ERA

Recently, ERA has undergone many relevant changes from inside. First of all, research and development became a domain of shared competence between the member states and the EU as a result of the new Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The subsequent strategic processes, such as the Lund Declaration, the Ljubljana Process, the Europe2020 Strategy and the Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union, have provided a solid mandate for a strong and open European Research Area that is highly responsive to societal challenges and provides excellent research and innovation activities in open exchange with the international RTI landscape.

However, in order to realise this ambitious agenda, the share of integrated research expenditure needs to be significantly increased. Furthermore, new coordination mechanisms are required to allow for flexible identification of ERA priorities, mobilisation of the critical mass of funding, and governance of its implementation.

In the last few years, a number of integrative instruments have been developed and implemented, such as:

  • Knowledge and innovation communities (KICs) selected within the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT)
  • ERA Net and ERA-Net Plus allowing for joint funding of EU and member states
  • Joint technology initiatives (JTIs article 187) developed through the European technology platforms (ETPs)
  • Joint programming in research (JPIs)
  • Public private partnerships (PPP)
  • Joint research programmes (article 185)
  • European research alliances
  • European innovation partnerships

Thus a number of opportunities and experiences for more integration and pre-allocating significant chunks of EU funding to joint priorities do exist. At the same time, there are many tensions associated with the implementation of these strategies.

A key challenge and opportunity for ERA development is its relation to and integration with the wider world. The production and composition of knowledge have become globalised. While science always has been international, the scope of actors and the need for coordination and cooperation across the globe has changed dramatically in the face of global challenges. At the same time, there is an increasing specialisation of knowledge production and exploitation. Global division of labour and connecting the global centres of excellence that have emerged is a key requirement of the future. In addition, many of the problems European societies face are either the same as for other societies (obesity, demographic change) or transnational in nature (climate change, pollution, security) while the EU is just one among many international players. The overarching challenge of decoupling economic growth from the depletion of the ecosphere and preserving natural capital demands an unprecedented alignment of efforts on a global scale.

There are a number of changes in the way research and innovation is being embedded in the societal context. Changing values and lifestyles are giving rise to new societal expectations of research and innovation. Changing economic and institutional contexts introduce new rationales into knowledge production. Established boundaries, such as basic and applied research or users and producers of innovation and knowledge, are blurring. New actors such as NGOs, citizens and user groups are increasingly playing relevant roles in the realm of research and innovation.

The need for research and innovation to address the grand challenges in realms such as health, food, security and sustainability is not only increasingly advocated but also poses new kinds of challenges. Transformative socio-technical pathways rather than isolated key technologies need to be explored. Social innovation, service organisation and organisational innovation need to be aligned with breakthrough technological innovation. Experimental approaches are gaining relevance for successful innovation trajectories, in particular when transitions are at stake. These changes make it imperative to situate ERA in the global context.

Identifying the Grand Challenges of the Future

In order to generate custom-made strategic intelligence for the future of ERA, the starting point was, first, to identify Grand Challenges (GC) and, secondly, to do so in relation to research sectors that are relevant to the ERA. The GC were identified based on existing EU documents and discussion papers that had been published in the context of pertinent foresight and horizon scanning projects. These GC were classified into relevant research sectors, for instance health, energy, environment and civil society. This approach allowed a thematic clustering of topics, which then served as a basis for broadening the scanning of FLAs. Ten sectors and more than 760 GC in total from a stock of 71 sources were identified.

The stocktaking was designed so as to collect information that would help reach the objective of the work package, i.e. to answer questions such as,

  • What Grand Challenges in the fields of economy, environment, geopolitics, society and ethics, technology and health are the documents and projects under consideration concerned with?
  • Do these documents and projects represent the discourse on Grand Challenges in the European Union and in other parts of the world?
  • What conclusions can we draw from these documents concerning the future governance needs of the ERA? And what do they tell us about the future requirements of RTI governance?

Sixteen Grand Challenges

The VERA team managed to identify 16 Grand Challenges from the analysis and clustering of 760 individual issues from the inventory and interviews with individual STI experts:

  1. Uncertainty is arising from a multipolar world

Increasing polarisation and regionalisation are driving towards a multipolar world. Possible evolutions and implications of or even solutions for this multi-aspect and multi-level challenge are still hardly understood.

  1. Values and attitudes are changing globally

Attitudes and values are changing globally; societies and particularly policy need to respond to these changes.

  1. The traditional role of the state is challenged

A number of developments require new models of governance that go beyond the traditional model of the state.

  1. The world is becoming more interconnected and thus more vulnerable

The more the world becomes interconnected and interdependent, the more new forms of crime and security threats are interlinked and have far-reaching consequences at all levels of society.

  1. Health concerns of an aging society are rising

The ageing of populations has diverse implications for science, technology, economy and society that are proliferated in the context of new health risks and ineffective health systems.

  1. A risk of financial system failure is emerging

In the financial sector the risk of systemic failures is increasing.

  1. Current non-sustainable economic models come under scrutiny

A growing unease with the current model of economic growth calls for alternative approaches to societal progress at the macro level. At the same time, environmentally sustainable business models are required in all sectors of economic activity.

  1. Migration requires responses

The challenge of migration takes many forms as a consequence of other challenges such as climate change, food and water shortages, natural disasters, pandemics etc., each of which requires a specialised and coordinated response at various levels of governance.

  1. Education is struggling to cope with new demands

The education and training systems in Europe need to be modernised. A more specific demand defines the need for education systems capable of promoting sustainability, innovation and solidarity values, and new professions require highly skilled craftsmanship.

  1. The health situation in deprived regions is deteriorating

Impoverished regions around the world are struggling with acute and virulent health issues.

  1. Climate change is causing new diseases

New health problems are arising globally due to climate change.

  1. Providing basic resources for increasing global demands becomes difficult

Without ecologically, economically and politically sustainable solutions, scarcities of basic resources may lead to extensive and serious social and political problems in some areas of the globe.

  1. Material resources are becoming increasingly scarce

Demand for metals and minerals is growing dramatically, especially due to the fast growth of emerging economies and increasing strategic demand for minerals in industrialised economies.

  1. Our modes of energy supply and use are threatening the survival of humankind

Adopting sustainable forms of energy production and consumption is one of the key means for mitigating climate change.

  1. Transportation systems are coming under strain

Environmental and health impacts from emissions, mitigation of climate change, urbanisation, the need for traffic safety and security, and avoidance of traffic jams are among the drivers pushing towards the reinvention of mobility and full-scale transition of existing transportation systems.

  1. EU competitiveness is endangered

The fragmentation of Europe, poor education and skills as well as rising costs and declining labour force participation caused by demographic change may prevent effective exploitation of Europe’s research and innovation potential.

Facing the Grand Challenges to the Future of Europe Means Facing the Global Ones First

From the analysis of a broad range of sources on Grand Challenges, it becomes clear that we cannot take a European perspective only. Especially not when attempting to identify ways of dealing with the Grand Challenges, or at least some of them. The most pressing challenges are globally interconnected and require global action. Topics like Our modes of energy supply (14), Providing basic resources for increasing global demands (12) and The world becoming more interconnected (4) are the ones most frequently discussed. They also show the need to accept shared responsibility on a global scale, which implies that the EU countries cannot lay back and point to other countries to take action. On the contrary, from a European perspective, European countries are among the major contributors to the drivers of the Grand Challenges and among the major countries affected as well, although the impacts of the Grand Challenges are more widespread globally than the drivers are.

The sixteen clusters identified and discussed above also seem to be the ones that call for policy action most immediately and represent the cases where such action could make a substantial difference if planned and executed in a systemic way.

To face the Grand Challenges to the future of Europe, most of all we need to cope with the global ones. If we make a major contribution to the global ones, we will be better equipped to cope with the challenges that lie ahead for Europe.

What we as Europeans have to face is that our lifestyle and the underlying economic model must be considered the root of fundamental problems with devastating global consequences. Many studies and independent resources have pointed this out before. It is of course not only the European lifestyle but also that of all developed economies. At the same time, the global interconnectedness that seems to make this lifestyle transferable to emerging, lagging and, in the long term, even to undeveloped economies also makes societies vulnerable to shocks in many respects.

Facing the Grand Challenges means to introduce fundamental changes in many areas of our lives and activities, thereby affecting global liaisons as well. Even if radical changes are unrealistic, the changes required in tackling the Grand Challenges will be felt by every European citizen. Policy-makers are in a crucial role as these changes will not occur without fundamental and coordinated policy measures in almost every policy area.

Furthermore, it becomes clear that the scope of these Grand Challenges is in essence societal. We need to take this into account when we talk about policy action, for example in the area of research, technology and innovation policy – in the respective work packages of the VERA project and beyond. We especially need to consider what the impact of that societal scope is with regard to the systemic character of handling the Grand Challenges.

Text Analysis and Discussion with “ERA Thinkers”

The second set of tasks performed was to synthesise the existing insights on trends, drivers and key dimensions of change in European RTDI governance. A computer-assisted analysis helped to characterise the body of discourse on ERA in a systematic and quantitative manner. The analysis of text data on ERA was expected to allow interpretations and descriptions of the attitudes, structures, values and norms that currently dominate STI governance. In view of the large quantities of data in textual form, text analysis provided an important means of discovering obscured meanings and unveiling hidden relationships. The computer-assisted analysis took as a point of reference a pre-understanding of ERA constituencies gained through literature review. Following the digitisation of the entire corpus, linguistic analysis software was used for cleaning and formatting, unitising and indexing. The development of categories and dictionaries, as well meaningful associations, relied on qualitative analysis techniques.

Quantitative text-analysis software allowed to produce an aggregation of unit-level coding. Statistical and network analysis software was used to highlight frequencies, trends, comparisons, networks and maps of relevant factors influencing STI governance.

Subsequent interviews with ERA “thinkers” served to obtain additional types of information (i.e. narratives, accounts, fronts, stories and myths).

Relevant factors identified by means of discourse and interview analysis provided the basis for a so-called key-factor workshop with key stakeholders. The insights on potential key factors were synthesised into a background document.

Based on these insights, VERA developed scenarios on the evolution of the European Research Area. VERA’s uniqueness is grounded in the systematic knowledge base it creates, for example, by stocktaking exercises such as the one on Grand Challenges described above. They are publicly accessible and intended to be used widely. At the same time, the results of these exercises feed the scenario process, the subsequent assessment of the scenarios, and the exploration of strategic options. Another distinct feature of VERA is that it pays particular attention to the assessment and policy implications of the scenarios, which will help to make scenario results useful for policy-making and thinking about the future of ERA.

Authors: Susanne Giesecke         Susanne.Giesecke@ait.ac.at

Philine Warnke             Philine.Warnke@ait.ac.at

Effie Amanatidou           effie.amanatidou@mbs.ac.uk

Sponsors: European Commission, DG Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Programme
Type: Multiple issue brief
Organizer: Fraunhofer Gesellschaft – ISI, Karlsruhe Germany, Stephanie Daimer, Stephanie.Daimer@isi.fraunhofer.de
Duration: 2012-2014
Budget: € 1,940,000
Time Horizon: 2030
Date of Brief: Decemeber 2012

Download EFP Brief No 251_VERA

Sources and References

References

The Lund Declaration (incl. its addendum), July 2009; available for download at

http://www.vr.se/download/18.7dac901212646d84fd38000336/ Lund_Declaration.pdf

Links to further results of the VERA project at http://www.eravisions.eu

The inventory contains 726 individual Grand Challenges named by the 67 screened FLAs. It has been submitted in an independent report and can be downloaded at http://vera.dev.zsi.at/stocktaking/list

EFP Brief No. 235: Nanotechnology for Podlaskie 2020

Friday, December 21st, 2012

The general purpose of the project was to elaborate a strategy of nanotechnology development up to 2020 based on the desired priority directions of the Polish Podlaskie province development oriented towards the application of nanotechnologies and the identification of the key nanotechnology research trajectories.

Nanotechnology to Boost Disadvated Region

The project Technological foresight NT FOR Podlaskie 2020. Regional strategy of nanotechnology development was granted the financial support from the EU Operational Program „Innovative Economy 2007-2013” (Priority 1: „Research and development of new technologies”, Measure 1.1.: „Support for scientific research for the building of knowledge based economy”, Sub-measure 1.1.1: „Research projects with the use of foresight method”.)

The project is an attempt of breakthrough technologies promotion in situation when the development of the traditional sectors does not contribute to regional growth. It is located in one of the least economically developed regions of Poland (and of the European Union) with a low level of population’s economic welfare, little business competitiveness and low innovation intensity in the spheres of technology, processes and products. The project is based on the feed forward logic which assumes that the future changes of the environment will be effectively forestalled owing to the project results. This should allow the region to chart the development trajectory which doesn’t imitate others but heads in the direction where the leaders will be in the future. The assumed goals of the programme are:

  • elaborate a strategy of nanotechnology development in Podlaskie province till 2020
  • identify and mapp critical nanotechnologies up to 2020
  • identify the most important factors influencing the development of nanotechnologies
  • put forward scenarios of nanotechnology development
  • stimulate the process of regional vision building between the key stakeholders.

Nanotech Research Defined by Six Panels

Six panels defined the research priorities for the project:

  1. Nanotechnologies in Podlaskie economy (RF1)
  2. Nanotechnology research for Podlaskie developement (RF2)
  3. Key factors of nanotechnology development (RF3)

In addition to the three content-oriented panels another three focusses on methodologies: STEEPVL and SWOT panel (SSP), Technology mapping and Key technologies panel (TMKTP), Scenarios and Roadmapping panel (SRP) (figure 1).

The results of the six panels are integrated by the Key Research Team (KRT) which is also a platform of interaction and knowledge transfer between the panels.

From STEEPVL Analysis to Strategy

The methodology of the project is based on the intuitive logics school of scenario construction and comprises the following research methods and techniques: STEEPVL analysis, SWOT analysis, technology maping, key technologies, scenario method, roadmapping (figure 2). The main research methods are supported by brainstorming, moderated discussion and bibliometrics.

The selection of methods and techniques was conditioned by the aim of the project, planned funds, research duration and availability of data – both quantitative and qualitative.

One of the innovative elements of the project is the implementation of the concept of triangulation to experts’ recruitment in the aspect of researcher triangulation, data triangulation and theoretical triangulation.

Researcher triangulation was manifested in the project by the involvement of experts representing varied professional background, sex and age. Special attention was paid to the recruitment of women and young people (under 35) (min. 30%).

Data triangulation was achieved by involving experts representing different institutions as well as by drawing information about the factors shaping nanotechnology development via experts’ opinions verified by the existing published works (reports, books, publications, Internet sources on nanotechnologies).

Theoretical triangulation consisted in the involvement of experts representing different research fields, but still salient to the nanotechnology development in Podlaskie province.

Other innovative element of the project was the application of the two-dimensional assessment of STEEPVL factors taking into account (1) the influence and importance of factors and (2) the application of factor analysis in order to reduce the number of considered factors that shape the nanotechnology development.

Great attention in the project was paid to the development of technology mapping methodology, to the identification and the assessment of wild cards methodology and to roadmapping methodology.

Scenarios of Nanotechnology Development in Podlaskie Province

 

As a result of the conducted sequence of procedures four scenarios of nanotechnology development in Podlaskie province were developed. They were constructed along two axes, one of which related to the level of R&D in the region and the other to the level of collaboration among the actors from business, science and administration spheres (fig. 3).

Basic characteristics of the produced scenarios are presented in table 1. Further in the process, each scenario was enriched with a detailed description of the remaining 19 STEEPVL factors. Short descriptive visions were also written in each of the four cases.

  1. Megatrends

Scenarios formulation was preceded by a detailed characteristics of megatrends influencing the nanotechnology development. Following megatrends were identified:

  • technological progress,
  • ageing population,
  • increasing importance of alternative energy sources,
  • intensified activity of the states in the realm of security,
  • new patterns of social inequality,
  • shaping of the new economy,

All megatrends were further divided into branching trends.

  1. Priority technology groups

Additionally, seven priority technology groups for the Podlaskie region were identified by the experts:

  • nanomaterials and nanosurfaces in medical equipment (T20),
  • composite materials for dentist fillings (T17),
  • powder technologies in plastic, paint and varnish production (T31),
  • surface nanotechnologies in biomedicine (T21),
  • nanotechnology for cutting instruments and wood processing (T3),
  • nanotechnology for specialised textiles (T24),
  • nano-structuring of metals (T38).

The leading project experts attempted to embed the priority nanotechnologies into four scenarios by assessing the chances of each technology’s development in the context of a particular scenario. The results of that exercise are presented in fig. 4.

According to experts’ opinions in conditions of high R&D potential for nanotechnology and effective regional collaboration of business, science and administration, very high chances of development have five out of seven technologies, namely: powder technologies in plastic, paint and varnish production (T31), composite materials for dentist fillings (T17), surface nanotechnologies in biomedicine (T21), nanotechnology for cutting instruments and wood processing (T3), nanomaterials and nanosurfaces in medical equipment (T20). In S2 scenario high chances of development have only nanotechnologies for specialised textiles (T24). The situation in S2 and S3 scenarios changes fundamentally as there are no nanotechnologies of high chances of development.

For each identified key technology a roadmap of its development was elaborated comprising layers such as: resources, R&D, technology and applications.

Increasing R&D and Strengthening the Network

Technology foresight NT FOR PODLASKIE 2020. Regional strategy of nanotechnology development has allowed to identify the most important factors of the nanotechnology development in the region. In the course of the project, the participating experts identified key technologies that might contribute to creating a competitive advantage of the province. The scenarios presented will be the basis for developing the roadmaps of nanotechnology development and eventually for formulating a regional strategy to that end.
 
As the results of the project have shown so far, increasing the region’s R&D potential and strengthening the networks of entrepreneurs, scientists and authorities would create an environment most conducive to the development of nanotechnology in Podlaskie province. These two key factors therefore will be the vital elementsof the nanotechnology development strategy to be formulated at a later stage. The strategy, according to the project organisers, will set the direction for the introduction of nanotechnology into the economy of Podlaskie province and provide a sound proposal for a path towards the sustainable development of the region.
Authors: Anna Kononiuk a.kononiuk@pb.edu.pl

Lukasz Nazarko l.nazarko@pb.edu.pl

Joanicjusz Nazarko j.nazarko@pb.edu.pl

Joanna Ejdys j.ejdys@pb.edu.pl

Katarzyna Halicka k.halicka@pb.edu.pl

Urszula Glinska u.glinska@pb.edu.pl

Alicja Gudanowska a.gudanowska@pb.edu.pl

Sponsors: European Regional Development Fund, Operational Program „Innovative Economy 2007-2013”

Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Polish Republic

Type: regional/technological foresight exercise
Organizer: Bialystok University of Technology

Joanna Ejdys j.ejdys@pb.edu.pl

Joanicjusz Nazarko j.nazarko@pb.edu.pl

Duration: Apr 2009-Jun 2013 Budget: 588,256 € Time Horizon: 2020 Date of Brief: Aug. 2012  

Download: EFP Brief No. 235_Nanotechnology for Podlaskie 2020.

Sources and References

Feasibility study of Technology foresight „NT FOR Podlaskie 2020”. Regional strategy of nanotechnology developement [Studium wykonalności projektu Foresight technologicznyNT FOR Podlaskie 2020”. Regionalna strategia rozwoju nanotechnologii], Białystok 2008.

EFP Brief No. 160: Future Jobs and Skills in the EU

Tuesday, May 24th, 2011

The renewed Lisbon strategy stresses the need for Europe to place more emphasis on anticipating skill needs. Globalisation, technological change and demographic developments (including ageing and migration) pose huge challenges in that respect, comprising both risks and opportunities. At the same time, a lack of information on future skill needs has been a long-standing concern in Europe. With specific targets set in the Lisbon strategy, the need for regular forward-looking assessments has gained momentum. Subsequently, this resulted in the recent New Skills for New Jobs initiative by the European Commission, and related European projects aimed at identifying future job and skills needs using quantitative modelling approaches. While having advantages of robustness, stakeholders as well as the European Commission identified a clear need for complementary, more qualitative forward-looking analysis. Consequently, the European Commission (DG EMPL) earlier this year commissioned a series of 17 future-oriented sector studies (Horizon 2020) on innovation, skills and jobs following a qualitative methodology. The final results of these studies will become available in spring 2009, and will be followed by a number of other initiatives over the year to come and beyond.

EFMN Brief No. 160_Future Jobs and Skills

EFP Brief No. 159: ForeSec: Europe’s Evolving Security

Tuesday, May 24th, 2011

The objective of ForeSec is to tie together the multiple threads of existing work on the future of European security in an attempt to provide a more coherent guidance, orientation and structure to all future security-related research activities. It aims at enhancing the common understanding of the complex global and societal nature of European security in order to pre-empt novel threats and capture technological opportunities. The project takes a participatory approach in an attempt to facilitate the emergence of a coherent and ho-listic approach to current and future threats and challenges to European security. ForeSec builds a pan-European network around the European security foresight processes and helps foster a societal debate on European security and security research. As this brief is published, ForeSec still has a few months of project work lying ahead. Accordingly, all results presented here are merely intermediate.

EFMN Brief no. 159_ForeSec

EFP Brief No. 154: Looking Forward in the ICT and Media Industry – Technological and Market Developments

Tuesday, May 24th, 2011

The project was an activity within the framework contract between the European Parliament and ETAG, the European Technology Assessment Group, to carry out TA studies on behalf of the Parliament’s STOA Panel in view of the growing importance of a European science and technology policy. The purpose of this particular project was to identify current and expected technological and market developments in the field of ICT with an impact on the media industry and to indicate regulatory challenges and requirements stemming from the anticipated changes. The main target group are the Members of the European Parliament; the wider addressee is the interested public.

EFMN Brief No. 154_ICT and Media Industry

EFP Brief No. 146: Germany 2020 New Challenges for a Land on Expedition

Sunday, May 22nd, 2011

The brief provides a short overview of a project in which Deutsche Bank Research has combined its own foresight expertise with inputs from the bank’s business strategists and external experts in order to develop scenarios for the future development of the German economy and society against the backdrop of intensifying structural change.

Germany on the Path toward a “Project Economy”

Deutsche Bank and its clients require knowledge about the future for their investment decisions. Deutsche Bank Research provides this “corporate foresight”. A multidisciplinary team develops and applies a wide range of methods to identify longterm macro trends. These foresight results, which are achieved on the basis of structured, process-based, quantitative and qualitative analyses, are fed into discussions with strategic management and clients as well as into public debate on broader economic, societal and political issues. The next two decades will be crucial for determining the path Germany will take over the long-term. Will German society be able to cope with the demographic pressures bearing down on the economy and the state’s finances? Will Germany succeed in redefining its role in the rapidly changing global economy and world order? Will Germany be a leader or a laggard on the road to a knowledge economy? Our first step was to sketch four alternative scenarios outlining how the German economy and society may have developed by the year 2020 (“Expedition Deutschland”, “Wild West”, “Drawbridge Up” and “Skatrunde (Playing Cards) with the Neighbours”). In the second step, we used broadly-based trend analysis to examine which of these four future scenarios is the most plausible.

The “Expedition Deutschland” Scenario – Knowledge and Cooperation Are Critical

The core elements of the “Expedition Deutschland” scenario for 2020 (formulated from the perspective of the year 2020) are the following:

In 2020, the “project economy” delivers 15% of value creation in Germany (in 2007 the figure was about 2%). The “project economy” refers to usually temporary, extraordinarily collaborative
and often global processes of value creation. For many companies, this type of cooperation is in many cases the most efficient way of doing business. This is because product life cycles have shortened further; the breadth and depth of the knowledge necessary for developing and marketing successful products have increased rapidly; successful products are increasingly the result of convergence between different fields of technology and knowledge; and many companies and research institutes are even more strongly specialised in 2020 than they were in 2007. Consequently companies collaborate ever more frequently on joint projects, often in the form of legally and organisationally independent project companies. They delegate specialised employees or parts of their organisation to these projects, invest capital or put their knowledge and networks at their disposal. In this way, companies can respond flexibly to the considerably higher demands on knowledge and rapidity in the global markets while sharing the costs and risks. This is often – but by no means always – their key to success: in 2020, too, collaboration generates considerable personal and strategic tensions. Factors that help to reduce the frictions on the technical side are mature, highly standardised information technologies. The project economy is closely intertwined with the traditional way of doing business. In 2020, many companies are continuing to go it alone with the market launch of their products. Often, though, these same companies cooperate in other markets – for instance the innovation-intensive ones – by taking the project economy approach. Germany’s small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) benefit in particular from the project economy. SMEs can use their advantages of specialisation and organisational flexibility – and are additionally boosted by a renewed surge in start-up activity. Open innovation processes helped to conquer new markets. In 2020, Germany has caught up with its competitors in markets for cutting-edge technology and knowledge-intensive services. Today, innovation is Germany’s core competence, with “Created in Germany” often being first choice, especially in Asia and the Middle East. Some of the main reasons for this success are collaborative innovation as well as intelligent sharing and exchange of knowledge and intellectual property. A project- economy approach to work has proved efficient especially in the early innovative and thus particularly knowledgeintensive phases of value creation. Moreover, many German corporations (and their local and international project companies) have benefited over the past few years from having more closely integrated the generation of “sovereign customers” into their processes. These customers are well networked via interactive forums and have up-to-date knowledge of prices and qualities in the areas that interest them. By contrast, many business investments in long-term research and development will have fallen by the wayside by 2020. They are often poorly adapted to the more short-lived valueadded patterns of today. Knowledge is traded in efficient markets in 2020. Knowledge
about customers, markets and many other topics is valued and traded much more efficiently today than back in 2007. The operators of such knowledge-based services are flourishing. Intellectual property has become a commonly used asset class:
investors may choose from a broad spectrum of topic-oriented patent funds, copyright securitisations etc. Moreover, intellectual capital has swung into the focus of company valuations:
the capital market now takes interest not only in a company’s traditional balance sheet ratios but also its research efficiency, education and training budget, and cooperation ratings.

The young and seasoned minds that house this intellectual capital benefit from efficient learning markets in 2020. Private operators of learning services prosper. Also, the public universities and other educational facilities have become more efficient following a wave of consolidation. Furthermore, they are more strongly involved in the market for modular education and training.

From Direct Regulation to Co-regulation

Government reduces its intervention and there is more coregulation. Co-regulation closely integrates citizens and companies. On the one hand, legitimation problems have motivated the state and still tight fiscal constraints have compelled it to cede part of its mandate to others. On the other, the regulatory issues have become increasingly complex. More than ever before, the state needs to tap the knowledge of citizens and companies to be able to set suitable framework conditions. Regulatory regimes that emerge in this way are more intelligently geared to the needs of business and society. They are more transparent for people and companies alike and ease the struggle into new markets. In general though the state’s abandonment of parts of its mandate has resulted in social transfers now coming with strings attached. In addition, more and more social services (e.g. long-term care) are organised on a private basis. Germany has become a “stakeholder society” based on reciprocal action.

Successful New Middle Class – Low Earners Lose Out

A new middle class emerges in German society by 2020, but the lower periphery falls behind. The middle class celebrates its comeback. The new opportunities for upward social mobility and the higher risk of social decline, both being the consequence of increasingly global and volatile value creation, have clearly shown the middle class the value of knowledge. Many Germans with a mid-range income therefore invest heavily in education – and thus gain qualifications for the demanding, but at the same time well-paying jobs in the project economy.

Well-educated older people also benefit as they are intelligently integrated in the working world in 2020. By contrast, low earners have only limited access to the new learning markets, and young and old alike often have to fear for their livelihoods. International competition has an even more incisive impact on this group than on others. Many low earners are compelled to organise themselves in self-help networks and many have lost their faith in politicians.

Globalisation, Diversification in Energy Supply  and Digitisation Are Other Key Trends

These elements, however, are interrelated with three other aspects of structural change which are already well under way and which, in our view, have rather trend-like characteristics.

Globalisation leads to new centres of gravity in the international value creation chain. 

   Energy supply shows a broader mix and decentralised production. 

       Digitisation enables networked goods flows in the new Internet. 

Given the structural changes outlined here on the way to “Expedition Deutschland”, we expect Germany’s gross domestic product to grow at an average rate of 1.5% per year up to 2020. From a 2007 perspective, these changes will pave the way to extraordinary opportunities for business, society and politics, but also harbour substantial risks. Some key fields of action for business include, for instance, a structured analysis of collaboration options, a more systematic assessment of intangible investments, broader acceptance of new forms of education and training, and an increase in life-long learning activities.

Innovative Methodology to Deal with High Complexity in Scenario Analysis

The guiding question for our scenario analysis is how will structural change have affected the German economy by the year 2020? In order to answer this question, we applied a methodology based on a simple scenario approach. Normally, one identifies the two key drivers to build a “scenario matrix”. Each field in the scenario matrix represents a different combination of attributes (high/high, high/low etc.) of these two drivers, and one scenario is developed from each of their respective interactions (see Figure 1, for an overview of the different elements of our scenario analysis see box on page 4). In addition to these drivers, whose future development is uncertain, there are a number of trend-like drivers – whose future development is comparatively predictable (in the following they are referred to for short as “trends”) – which impact on all four scenarios. These trends show similar developments in all four scenarios.

But our scenario question is multi-faceted; the number of relevant drivers and trends is high. To cope with this complexity without losing too much information, we have advanced the above approach: we have aggregated drivers that are thematically related and whose development is correlated into “dynamics” (the trends, too, are aggregated into “trend-like dynamics”, see the figure Deriving scenarios by reducing complexity). Instead of taking individual drivers, we build the scenario matrix with the two key dynamics. Further information and a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of this approach can be found at www.expeditiondeutschland.de/en.

Nonetheless, through interaction with the other drivers, the trends can develop or impact slightly differently or at a different pace in each scenario. 

In the scenario method these drivers are often referred to as “determinants” and the trends as “premises“.

146_bild1

Concept of the “Most Plausible Scenario”

Classic scenario analysis examines alternative future developments – but without highlighting any one of the depicted scenarios as the most probable scenario. For good reason since the scenario method does not in itself deliver any (or sufficient) indications as to which picture of the future is the most probable.

We are deliberately breaking with tradition of future research here: we identified a number of trends or trend-like dynamics that have an exceptionally strong influence and whose general future development can be predicted particularly reliably. They are driving Germany in the direction of one of our four scenarios and therefore make it particularly plausible. We refer to this scenario as the focus scenario and call it “Expedition Deutschland“. These trends relate to developments in a broad spectrum of fields in business, society and politics as well as in science and technology. They partly reinforce each other, a factor that has further encouraged us to focus on this one scenario.[1]

[1] We have systematically analysed the interactions between many of these trends in the earlier project “Global Growth Centres 2020” (see Bergheim, Stefan (2005), loc. cit.).

Our focus on this scenario should therefore not be seen as a normative statement: our message is not that we are placing this scenario in the spotlight because it is the “most desirable” one in our view. But, despite all the plausibility bonuses derived from our trend analysis in favour of this scenario over the other three, the following needs to be stressed:

Our focus scenario is not a forecast. In 2020, Germany will look only in parts like we have described in our scenario. Rather, there will be a mix of elements of all four (and maybe other possible) scenarios.

Elements of our scenario analysis

“Driver”. Important factor of influence on future structural change in Germany whose future development is difficult to predict.

“Trend” (trend-like driver). Important factor of influence on future structural change in Germany whose future development is reliably predictable.

“Dynamic”. Aggregation of (mostly non-trend-like) drivers which are thematically related and whose development is correlated. The future development of a dynamic as a whole (without drawing on additional information) is difficult to predict.

“Trend-like dynamic”. Aggregation of (mostly trend-like) drivers that are thematically related and whose development is correlated. The future development of a trend dynamic as a whole is reliably predictable.

“Scenario”. An, in itself, consistent picture of the future (in this case of the German economy and society) derived from a

given combination of developments of the dynamics considered (and the expected developments of the trend-like dynamics). “Consistent“ means here that the interaction of the various elements has been taken into account.

“Focus scenario”. The one of our four alternative scenarios for Germany in the year 2020 which we consider to be the most plausible owing to the future impact of some of the above “trends“ and “trend dynamics“.

Our message is that, as far as we can judge today, it appears plausible that Germany is more likely to resemble our focus scenario than the other pictures of the future developed here.

Illustration of the Scenarios

We have developed posters to sum up the content and convey an intuitive image of the key messages of our four scenarios. They depict the behaviour of businesses and citizens (as persons), the market playing field (as environment/terrain) and the regulatory framework (as sky/weather) in 2020. To give an example, here we show the poster for the “Expedition Deutschland” scenario discussed above.

146_bild2

Authors: Jan Hofmann  jan-p.hofmann@db.com; Ingo Rollwagen   ingo.rollwagen@db.com; Stefan Schneider     stefan-b.schneider@db.com
Sponsors: n.a
Type: n.a
Organizer: Deutsche Bank Research
Duration: 2006 – 2008
Budget: n.a.
Time Horizon: 2020
Date of Brief: January 2008

Download: EFMN Brief No. 146_Germany 2020

Sources and References

  • expeditiondeutschland.de/en
  • dbresearch.de

EFP Brief No. 137: The Future of Manufacturing in Europe A Survey of the Literature and a Modelling Approach

Saturday, May 21st, 2011

Manufacturing in Europe is facing challenges that may impact on its performance in the near future: the emergence of international competitors, new technologies allowing the emergence of new business models, increased off-shore and relocated activities. The aim of this study was to provide policy-makers with a long-term vision of European manufacturing, its characteristics, its place in the EU economy, in the world and the main challenges it will be facing. Its purpose was to identify, on the basis of current demographic, environmental, technological, economic and social trends, and possible scenarios, the likely bottlenecks, unsustainable trends and major challenges that European manufacturing will have to face over the coming 30 years. From this, implications for various microeconomic policies, notably for industrial policy, were explored, contributing to the mid-term review of industrial policy in 2007 by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry.

Future of European Manufacturing

Manufacturing in Europe is affected by a changing world. In 2004, ten countries joined the EU followed by Bulgaria and Rumania in 2007. Most of the new member states have a different economic structure and other comparative advantages than the ‘old’ EU-15, in particular in labour-intensive industries. This is also the case for the candidate countries from the Balkans and Turkey. Enlargement hence not only offers opportunities in terms of a larger domestic EU market, but also in terms of specialisation and – associated – economies of scale and scope.
Secondly, a new wave of globalisation unprecedented in terms of scale and speed is unfolding. This process of economic integration – with resources becoming more mobile, economies becoming increasingly interdependent and financial markets becoming increasingly international – has important implications for the future of manufacturing. This also holds for the integration of China and India in the world economy; each is home to about 20 percent of world population. Both countries are leading and highly competitive exporters, India in software and IT-enabled services, and China in skill-intensive manufactures. Especially China has emerged as the powerhouse of the Asian region and has in less than 20 years become the world’s manufacturing and trading platform. Globalisation has also impacted European manufacturing in another way: lower production costs and the potential of new consumer markets have caused European manufacturers to increase the quality and design of their products and
have led to international sourcing of (parts of their) production. Thirdly, consumer demand in Europe itself is changing. As its citizens are becoming wealthier, they demand more services and place higher requirements on manufactured goods. Demographics (ageing) might strengthen this change. Finally, the pace of technological change appears to have sped up in viewof globalisation and increasing international competition. Globalisation, EU integration, shifting demand and progress in science and technology, and innovation – whether disruptive or not – will all have a major impact on how the manufacturing landscape in Europe in terms of location, production, distribution of labour and physical appearance will manifest itself in the near and longer-term future. The purpose of this long-term scenario study was twofold: (1) to provide policy-makers, decision-makers and others with
two long-term scenario-based views on the future of European manufacturing and (2) to explore the scope for EU policies to positively address and influence the future.

Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Foresight Approaches

The scenarios in this study have been developed in three consecutive stages, consisting of (i) a survey of existing futures studies, (ii) the drafting of qualitative scenarios, and (iii) a quantification of the scenarios using WorldScan, a dynamically applied general equilibrium model for the world economy. This approach was designed as a hybrid combining the traditional foresight studies with more quantitative oriented economic-scenario studies.
One important difference between the two groups of studies is the detail with which technological factors are explored in the foresight studies compared to the economic-scenario and modelling studies, which generally treat them as exogenous factors. Furthermore, while the foresight studies, in contrast to the modelling studies, largely employ qualitative scenarios, this study aims at combining the benefits of both approaches:
first synthesising the results from many foresight studies to develop qualitative scenarios, followed by a quantification of the expected implications to check for the consistency of the scenarios as well as assess the expected impacts of policy packages. Furthermore, the communities conducting foresight studies and economic-scenario modelling studies have largely co-evolved with little interaction between them. This has led to foresight studies, focusing on participative processes and qualitative (policy) analyses and recommendations, producing
results that are challenged by approaches focusing on quantitative analyses. This study therefore aimed to bridge the two communities by employing methods used in each of them. As such, the results of the study can also be seen as an experiment on how to conduct such studies in the future, combining methods from different communities.

A Three Part Structure

As outlined above the study consisted of three distinct parts: a literature survey, the development of qualitative scenarios and the quantification of the scenarios using a modelling approach.

Survey of Future Studies

The survey of futures studies served two goals: (1) to help identify the relevant main drivers and trends that form our current perspective and knowledge that can be seen as key to the future of manufacturing in Europe and (2) to explore what other expert groups and think tanks regard as possible manufacturing futures.

The timeframe considered in the literature surveyed ranged from 2015 to 2050. During the course of stage one, 101 foresight reports, scenario studies, academic publications and policy documents were surveyed along five clusters: international, technological, social and environmental trends and drivers as well as new business models. The studies surveyed covered European studies, global studies, North-American studies and South-East Asian studies in order of importance.

FutMan, ManVis and Manufuture – three major EU-wide foresight projects conducted over the past five years – formed the backbone of the survey. The results of these foresight studies were supplemented by other materials ranging from theme or aspect futures studies (e.g. expected income developments; impacts of climate change) to similar foresight studies carried out in other countries, such as the U.S. (e.g. IMTI, 1998; SRI), Japan (Nistep, 2005) and China (NRCSTD, 2005 – for further references see full background report [Zee & Brandes, 2007]).

Qualitative Scenarios

The survey identified at least five sets of major drivers affecting the future of European manufacturing. These drivers are: (1) globalisation and international competition, (2) technological progress, (3) socio-demographic change (in income and wealth, social values, shifting preferences, ageing), (4) energy and resource scarcity, and (5) climate change and the environment. Based on these, two scenarios were developed: Cosy at Home and Adventuring the World. The two scenarios exemplify two explicit but ‘moderate extremes’ based on further integrating markets, on the one hand, and a stalling or reversal of market integration, on the other. In Cosy at Home, inwardlooking, risk-averse, indecisive behaviour dominates the public as well as the private realm. In Adventuring the World outward-looking (resulting in a further opening-up), risk-loving and pro-active behaviour is prime.Cosy at Home  This scenario depicts a European manufacturing sector that faces an overall business and political climate that gradually becomes more inward-looking and passive. Uncertainty and indecisiveness at world level are answered with

a European response of retreat. Politically unstable regions, threats of international terrorism, absence of binding action at global scale to tackle the negative consequences of climate change and the inevitable depletion of fossil fuels, and – related – a lack of real breakthroughs in alternative energy production and promising new technologies (nanotechnology and to a lesser extent biotechnology), give people the feeling of standstill and uneasiness. This in turn translates into a downturn in consumer and producer confidence and more inward-looking and risk-averse behaviour. Trust is something that may be found close by, but certainly not far from home. Rising energy prices and strong increases in monitoring and control of international movements of persons, goods and services result in a cost explosion in international transport and trade, which significantly alters the turn-of-the-century trend towards a further integrated world economy.

Adventuring the World  This scenario depicts a European manufacturing sector that is faced with an overall business and political climate of international cooperation, openness, but also strong competition. European self-confidence strengthens as the political and ideological emptiness that characterised the turn-of-the-century era has been replaced with new inspiring notions of Europe’s role in the world. This includes Europe assuming the position of a front-runner in solving problems of global warming, energy use and ageing as well as major breakthroughs in European social and cultural integration. Renewed decisiveness has triggered momentum at the global level and geo-political instability and threats of international terrorism are gradually disappearing. Considerable progress is made in alternative energy production and promising new technologies (nanotechnologies and biotechnology) have taken hold. A general upswing in consumer and producer confidence combines with new openness, and outward-looking and adventurous entrepreneurial behaviour. Trust relationships thrive. Rising energy prices stimulate new and more cost efficient energy-saving ways of transport of persons and products. Adequate road pricing and energy taxation increasingly supplant traditional labour taxes, making mobility and energy consumption better manageable and curbing harmful consequences.

Quantification of Scenarios

In the third step, the scenarios were quantified using an applied general equilibrium model for three main purposes: (1) the model ensured that the scenarios were consistent, since economic variables allow to describe and relate constraints and the current knowledge about interactions in the economy in a consistent form; (2) the quantification gave a feeling for the relative importance of various developments for the future well-being of society; (3) the model also offered the possibility of assessing the impact of framework policies and their relative importance.
However, large parts of the scenarios could not be quantified, as the general trends observed are expected to impact variables over too long time horizons for workable quantitative assumptions. The complex feedback loops furthermore make it only realistic to illustrate the scenario trends related to economic growth and economic integration, which are at the heart of the WorldScan model. (For details on the quantification of the scenarios and their expected impact on manufacturing please see the ‘final report’).

Impact of Framework Policies on Scenarios

The quantification of scenarios sketched the macroeconomic developments, showing the possible impact of globalisation, technological change, ageing and structural change towards a service economy on economic growth and trade. Europe is expected to become less important as a place for manufacturing production in both scenarios as manufacturing shifts to Asia. The question whether these trends could be affected by policies was assessed in the third step. Rather than thinking about targeting and subsidizing specific industries, framework policies that could affect the environment where industrial production takes place in Europe were modelled for potential impact on the scenarios. The framework policies analysed were: (1) upgrading skills, (2) more effective regulation and less administrative burdens for firms, (3) R&D and innovation policies, (4) a strong competitive single market, (5) environmental policies, (6) supporting energy policies and (7) global trade policy. The macro-economic outcomes for the EU as a whole in 2025 for both scenarios were analysed under the different framework policies. The differences between the two scenarios are minor. In Adventuring the World, GDP increases slightly more than in Cosy at Home, mainly because of the large impact of R&D and internal market policies. Exports increase faster in Cosy at Home, largely due to a composition effect of a higher share of total exports destined for other European countries. An increase in intra-EU exports due to new single market policies thus has a larger effect on total exports. R&D and innovation policies have the largest impact representing about 40% of the total GDP effect based on the lower bound returns in the literature. The reduction in administrative burden adds about 1.5% to GDP, internal market policies about 2% and skills even less. However, over time, when the whole labour force has been educated, the effects of upgrading skills will be larger. From Gelauff and Lejour (2006) we know that GDP effects will be three times as high in 2040 compared to 2025. However, compared to other framework policies, the economic effects even in 2040 will be unsubstantial.

A Future for Manufacturing

The analysis has shown that the share of manufacturing in employment and value added has decreased in Europe for decades reflecting structural changes in the global economy. However, manufacturing will remain important for trade and productivity increases, outpacing by far the service sector.

Global manufacturing is expected to grow, fuelled by Asian economic development. Nevertheless, there is a future for manufacturing in Europe. In 2025, Europe’s share in global manufacturing production and trade is estimated to be about 20%, much higher than its share in global population. Manufacturing is also estimated to contribute more than 15% to European value added in 2025 and to remain the most important driver for exports. A further strengthening of the internal market and adequate R&D and innovation policies can have a substantial impact on these shares. Both can be influenced by EU policy-making, but the framework policies cannot reverse the trends in shares of value added and employment. Within the manufacturing sector various developments will take place. The study discriminated between ten aggregate manufacturing sectors: ‘food products’, ‘textiles and wearing apparel’, ‘wood and other manufacturing’, ‘pulp, paper and publishing’, ‘chemicals, rubber and plastics’, ‘basic metals’,
‘non-metallic minerals’, ‘electronic equipment’, ‘transport equipment’ and ‘other machinery and equipment’. Based on
historical productivity growth paths of these sectors, their trade openness, R&D intensity, energy efficiency and skill intensity, it is highly likely that these (sub)sectors will develop differently over time. This also applies to subsectors within the ten sectors identified. Most sectors can distinguish between basic and specialized manufacturing activities, with basic manufacturing on average being more affected by international
competitiveness than specialized manufacturing.

Openness a Key Determinant

A number of interesting conclusions about the future of manufacturing in Europe were drawn. The increase in trade and,more generally, globalisation appears to be one of the most important drivers, making the sectors that are already most open to international trade also the ones mostly affected in the future. They include textiles and wearing apparel, wood and other manufacturing, chemicals, rubber and plastics, electronic equipment, transport equipment and other machinery and equipment. Overall, the sectors food products and pulp, paper and publishing will be less influenced. These are more domestically oriented sectors, less R&D intensive and face less technological
progress. Europe has no comparative advantages in textiles and wearing apparel, electronic equipment and basic
metals. This disadvantage will become further manifest in the oncoming twenty years. In particular, this applies to electronic equipment, which – while in the past representing a relatively large sector – will decline even further. Textiles and wearing apparel is an already small sector in terms of value added and employment, which means that an even less prosperous future for this sector will also have less overall impact. Chemicals, rubber and plastics, transport equipment and other transport and equipment will be the most important manufacturing sectors in Europe,
despite a deteriorating comparative advantage in the other machinery and equipment sector. These sectors are important for European exports and will account for about a quarter of global production and trade in these sectors over the coming decades. Of the framework policies analysed in this study, improving skills, reducing the administrative burden and increasing energy efficiency, have the least impact on manufacturing. R&D and
innovation policies and strengthening the internal market, on the other hand, have the strongest and most positive impact on manufacturing. They are also the most ambitious in terms of policy formulation and implementation, and potentially very effective in supporting manufacturing because of their R&D intensity and open-to-trade nature. In the coming decades, Europe’s decreasing share in global manufacturing production and trade will flatten. The EU framework policies support this slowing of the relative decline of manufacturing activities in Europe, which may even come to a near standstill in sectors such as chemicals, rubber and plastics, and combined machinery and equipment.

Authors: Felix Brandes (TNO-IPG)  felix.brandes@tno.nl
Sponsors: European Commission – DG Enterprise & Industry
Type: European futures study on manufacturing
Organizer: CPB, the Netherlands (Arjan Lejour) & TNO-IPG (Frans van der Zee)
Duration: 01/2007-05/2007
Budget: 130,000€
Time Horizon: 2037
Date of Brief: March 2008

Download: EFMN Brief No. 137_ Manufacturing in Europe

Sources and Links

The key results of the study were published as part of Chapter 5 of the European Competitiveness Report 2007. More details and the full scenarios are published in the background reports and final report and can be accessed via the website of the European Commission and the CPB the Netherlands.
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/industry/index _en.htm

Brandes, F., A. Lejour, G. Verweij & F. van der Zee (2007)
“The Future of Manufacturing in Europe”, Final Report, 31st May 2007, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/industry/doc/f
uture_manufacturing_europe_final_report.pdf

CEC (2007) “Chapter 5: The Future of Manufacturing in Europe – a survey of the literature and a modelling approach”
in European Competitiveness Report 2007, 31st October 2007,SEC (2007)1444, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/competitiveness/1_eucompetrep/eu_compet_reports.htm

Lejour, A. & G. Verweij (2008) “Two quantitative scenarios
for the future of manufacturing in Europe”, CPB Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, available at http://www.cpb.nl/nl/pub/cpbreeksen/document/160/doc160.pdf

Zee, F.A van der & F. Brandes (2007) “Manufacturing Futures
for Europe: A survey of the literature”, TNO the Netherlands,
available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/industry/doc/future_manufacturing_europe_literature_final_report.pdf

EFP Brief No. 135: Globalisation in the 21st Century: Where Optimism and Fear Collide

Saturday, May 21st, 2011

Globalisation has become a keyword of the 21st century. Who are the winners and who are the losers in a globalised world? The term globalisation triggers extremely contradictory emotions among the people of Europe. One third of Europeans (33%) regard themselves as winners of this development and see globalisation as a kind of liberation from overly constrictive and outdated boundaries. In contrast, one in five citizens feels to have lost out in this process (21%). Europeans only agree on one issue: the process of globalisation can neither be halted nor reversed. These are the results of the first European representative study that asked 11,000 citizens aged 14 and above in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Russia and Switzerland about their hopes and fears for the future. The study was part of a research project by the Stiftung für Zukunftsfragen (Foundation for Research on the Future) of British American Tobacco.

Germans and Hungarians Regard Themselves as the Losers of Globalisation– Finns as the Winners

The effects of globalisation were subject to extremely different interpretations in the individual European countries: over half of the Finns questioned (51%) see themselves as winners. The Belgians (43%), Swiss (43%) and British (39%) take a similarly positive view of the future. Equally for the French (37%), Italians (25%) and Russians (24%), the hope of being able to profit from globalisation is greater than any fears they have. The Hungarians and Germans, however, are of a less positive mindset. In both countries, less than one in five (19%) believes that globalisation would have positive effects on their future. In these two countries, globalisation is evidently not the problem, but rather the degree of inequality and the subjectively perceived unjust distribution of the benefits of globalisation
between the winners and losers. Citizens doubt whether this distribution is socially just and fair.

Survey of Nine Countries

A representative face-to-face approach was used for this study. The interviewees were given a list of possible answers, which were presented in a random order. A total of 11,000 people aged 14 and above were questioned in nine countries. A sample of either 1,000 or 2,000 people was surveyed in each country. The study was conducted in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Russia and Switzerland between 14 September and 26 October 2007. The underlying definition of Europe was not based on membership in the European Community but on geographical criteria. The countries were selected to ensure that nations from all European
regions were included in the sample. The European study was a research project of the German BAT Stiftung für Zukunftsfragen. An external market research institute GfK (Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung) and its partners in the various countries conducted the study.

What is the Stiftung für Zukunftsfragen?

The BAT Stiftung für Zukunftsfragen, a German foundation for examining societal expectations, promoting the scientific debate on issues determining our future and furthering approaches to a sustainable resolution of social issues of the future. Futurologists at this foundation have been examining societal expectations since 1979. The foundation acts as an independent interface between science, economics, media and politics. For many important opinion leaders, the foundation’s future research has provided support for political and social decision-making processes for decades.

Health, Family, Friendship – Quality of Life in Europe

According to the study, the most enduring and sustainable future safeguard for all Europeans is, without a doubt, quality of life. First and foremost, quality of life means one’s health (95%), family (90%) and friends (88%) – partnership (78%), nature, education and work (76% each) are rated slightly lower. Spending money and having leisure time (65% each) are regarded as important by two thirds of those questioned. Religion is mentioned by only one third of the people asked (30%) as a factor significant to personal well-being with even sports ranking higher (39%).

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In this new Europe-wide study, major differences within the countries surveyed can be identified:

  • Italians love culture and are proud of their faith. In Italy, culture (76%) and religion (48%) are of above-average importance compared to the other countries; in contrast leisure time (51%) and spending money (53%) play a subordinate role.
  • For Russians, the family, consumption and money are particularly important. Russia is the only country where the family (90%) ranks first; the importance of spending money (74%) is also significantly above the average value. On the other hand, friendships (68%), education (62%) and nature (48%) are rated as least relevant compared to other countries.
  • The British attach importance to lifelong learning. Amongst all of those questioned, the citizens of the United Kingdom state education most frequently (86%) as a guarantee for the future.The Finns are nature lovers. In addition to nature (91%), leisure time (85%) and sports (71%), friendships (94%) and partnerships (84%) are mentioned as important for quality of life.
  • For the Germans, health (98%) is integral to quality of life. This nation, however, attaches the least importance to family, culture and religion of all the countries surveyed.
  • The Hungarians are seeking for consumption. In Hungary, spending money (84%) plays the biggest role compared to the other countries.
  • The Swiss count on partnerships. On average, the Swiss mentioned the lowest number of factors as important for future quality of life – this may be because many of the conditions are already in place today. The significance of partnerships is above average (83%), whilst the relevance of spending money was the lowest of all the countries.
  • The French want a bit of everything. The French mention the greatest number of factors of all those questioned. Family (95%) and culture (75%) in particular are important for quality of life.
  • Belgians set particular store by spending money (76%). Furthermore, in no other country do more respondents mention the family as significant (95%).

Europeans do not necessarily wish to improve their standard of living but rather their quality of life. Answers to the question “What are we living for?” are called for. There was agreement amongst those questioned that one’s own health is “the” prerequisite for quality of life. This is followed by family and friends in almost all countries. Alongside health, social areas are coming to the fore. On the other hand, the importance of aspects which were formerly central to quality of life, such as work, consumption and leisure time, is declining.

Crime, Aggressiveness, Lack of Honesty: Europeans’ Fears for the Future

Crime is Europe’s unsolved problem. Two thirds (66%) of those questioned from Helsinki to Rome, Moscow to Zurich and Berlin to London state that fear for their own safety was – by far – their greatest worry for the future. The majority of concerns are focused on interpersonal dealings associated with a feared loss of prosperity. Aside from fear of crime, increasing levels of aggressiveness (51%), decreasing honesty (41%), selfishness (38%) and intolerance (37%) are all causes for concern. The consequences could be loneliness (29%) or social exclusion (27%), which almost inevitably result in social conflict. The entire network that unites, keeps together and protects society is in question.

The citizens of the various countries express different fears:

  • Crime is mentioned most frequently in Switzerland (80%) and least frequently in France (49%).
  • Intolerance, on the other hand, is rated highest in France (58%) and lowest in Russia (15%).
  • Xenophobia is also not a major issue in Russia (8%), whilst for the Swiss this is particularly relevant (44%).
  • Social conflict is mentioned in Germany (42%) twice as often as in Italy (21%).
  • Envy is a far more significant issue in Belgium (39%) than in the United Kingdom (15%).
  • Lack of respect for children is hardly of relevance in Hungary (15%), whilst in Germany this is a major issue (40%).
  • Indifference as a concern for the future is mentioned by a majority of Finns (53%) compared to only a minority of the British (18%).

Social cohesion as a society’s central resource is threatened. It is being replaced by an aggregation of individuals whose behaviour is determined by short-term cost-benefit calculations and guided by the question: “How can I benefit?” Every single society requires a minimum of solidarity and feeling of community. This, however, requires that people are united and feel responsible for one another. Just as the desire for a sense of community, solidarity and security grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to satisfy these wishes. This presents a challenge to every single one of us. Politics is only in a position to provide the framework, whereas people are responsible for implementation.

Friendship, Social Justice,  Reliability: Europe’s Future Values

Europeans are just as aware of their fears as they are of potential solutions. There are signs of a positive change in values: the focus is shifting towards pro-society values, aimed at ensuring harmonious cohabitation. These values include friendship (65%), social justice (60%) and reliability (59%). There is also agreement amongst the majority of people asked about the following values: love (58%), helpfulness (55%), freedom (53%) and friendliness (50%). In response to the question which values are particularly important to the person questioned, the following rate slightly lower: loyalty (48%), conscientiousness and social responsibility (46% each).

Comparing the answers given in the various countries, it becomes clear that there are different needs and requirements. For example, helpfulness, conscientiousness and reliability are at their loudest in Germany. In comparison, in Great Britain friendliness, loyalty and social responsibility are demanded first and foremost. The Swiss wish for love and responsibility, whilst the Finns demand freedom and social justice. Europeans want to see a quick end to looming social erosion. They are willing to undergo moral renewal. Research in the nine
European countries has shown that there are signs of a renaissance of faith in the future. The citizens of Europe are becoming increasingly confident. The age of egoism is slowly coming to an end. And reliability can once again begin to take hold where arbitrariness once flourished.

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First Approach for the

Future of Europe

The results of the study will be interpreted in detail and published in March as a hardcopy (about 80 pages, German and English). This publication will be sent to members of the German and the European parliament who deal with issues affecting the future of Europe. Press releases will be sent out in all nine participating countries. The study is a first approach at addressing one of the main projects of the foundation in 2008 called The Future of Europe. Members of the EFMN Network who are interested in the publication can contact the foundation by email and we will send a copy of the study (a PDF file) in the 2nd half of March 2008.

Authors: Ulrich Reinhardt Ulrich_Reinhardt@bat.com
Sponsors: BAT Stiftung für Zukunftsfragen (British American Tobacco Foundation for Future Research)
Type: National foresight exercise, single issue
Organizer: BAT Stiftung für Zukunftsfragen, Alsterufer 4, 20354 Hamburg, Germany
Duration: 2007-2008
Budget: 100,000€
Time Horizon: 2007
Date of Brief: January 2008

Download: EFMN Brief No. 135_ BAT 21st century globalisation

Sources and References

www.batstiftung.com

EFP Brief No. 133: The Role of the EU in the World

Saturday, May 21st, 2011

The purpose of the present brief is to explore how foresight studies perceive, interpret and handle the EU’s role in the world. The examination of its role can be interpreted in different ways, can include a wide range of perspectives, and can apply to various levels of reference (political, social, economic, technological, scientific etc.). We have focused on the concerns and challenges the European Commission has noted as of major importance in the coming years.

The Multi-faceted ‘Role  of the EU in the World’

The role of the EU in the world, in the view of the European Commission, is a multifaceted one. This is expressed in the documents Socioeconomic Sciences and Humanities Workprogramme 2007-2008 (p. 4, 23-26) and Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe. A Public Consultation Paper in view of the 2008/2009 Budget Review (sect. 2.1). The underlying reasoning in all of the documents analysed is that the EU has to increase its role and presence worldwide. This is considered a necessity, both to be able to protect its interests and values successfully as well as to contribute to world stability and development drawing upon its broad experience, strengths and unique characteristics.

Increasing the role of the EU is seen as imperative in response to the implications of and challenges brought by globalisation, the changing interactions between world regions and the rise of new global players. A second line of argumentation emphasizes the need to develop crosscutting policies to face global challenges that go beyond national borders like climate change and biodiversity, demographic change and migration, competitiveness, terrorism and organised crime, or sustainable energy. A third line of argumentation refers to the increasing role of the European dimension in boosting knowledge, mobility,competitiveness and innovation within a globalised environment of scientific and technological progress.

Text Analysis & Intelligent Reading

The methodology applied to identify and retrieve the information relevant to the subject matter involved ‘text analysis’ as well as ‘intelligent reading’ of relevant studies and reports.

The text analysis involved 160 studies from the EFMN database. These studies represent a variety of backgrounds, scopes, themes, horizons and scales. First, a small number of relevant studies with a title strongly related to our research topic was selected. Using the semantic data mining tool “Text analyst”, the texts were then analysed to identify the most relevant keywords and semantic relations between them. This list of keywords was then used to analyse the 160 selected studies.

Thus sentences including any of the keywords were identified. These were then read in the original context. If the section in which the sentence occurred was regarded as providing new or additional information, then it was also marked as relevant. The final result was a text file containing the relevant sentences and sections from the original studies with information related to the selected topic and a reference to the original document.

The EU’s role in the world being a very broad, general and international topic, we did not expect it to be treated as a core subject in relevant foresight studies. Foresight studies usually focus on more specific challenges and issues. They examine more generic challenges at the level of defining the background and setting the framework of analysis. Furthermore, most of the foresight studies have a national or regional, rather than a European or international scope.1 These factors limited the related information yielded by the text analysis even though a second round of text analysis was carried out including foresight studies of a trans-/international scope only. In consequence, additional documents considered relevant were also reviewed. These included EFMN publications and background documents as well as reviews of books dealing with the future of Europe.

EU as a Global Player

The role of the EU in relation to the changing interactions between world regions and the rise of new global players is examined in foresight studies from a whole range of perspectives (political, socio-economic, technological, scientific and cultural).

Towards European Democracy and Citizenship

The political aspect given to the EU’s role examines the internal challenges the EU has to face to further develop the definition of European citizenship as well as the degree to which the EU’s institutional architecture can be a model for new forms of governance.

In the study Democracy and Futures (Finnish Committee for the Future), R. Cinquegrani analyses different aspects of the concept of democracy within the context of the European Union. Several issues are addressed ranging from understanding and managing the connection between all the new and different social, economic and political positions inside the EU to defining a European democracy and citizenship or handling exclusivists’ conceptions of the state and the consequent implications for minority issues.

Governance Models for the Developing World

There are diverse views on the role that the EU can play as a model for the democratisation of the developing world. In the Democracy and Futures study, T. Murata examines the future of democracy in India and China and the degree to which these countries can be models for democracy in the developing world. He argues that many developing states needing better governance structures are likely to find a better match in the well established Indian model rather than the existing US model or the currently developing European one. India has a long tradition of liberal representative government and has been dealing relatively effectively with large language, ethnic, religious and communal divides.
Despite its recent economic growth, India remains part of the developing world due to its large poor and agrarian population, and large, poorly integrated territory. Thus, it is likely that its solutions are more applicable to the many developing states which are the same countries often referred to as “emerging democracies” in Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Indonesia and the Philippines.
Regarding China the author asserts that the conspicuous lack of a liberal, representative democracy and the communist regime are counterbalanced to a certain point by a passionate desire for political participation in China. In addition, its historical support for anti-colonial, pro-independence struggles allows China to enjoy respect and legitimacy in many parts of the developing world. Many also see a major possibility for the Chinese people to successfully “leapfrog” into a new political future having a fair chance of incorporating current technologies to better approximate true democracy than the currently dominant representative government. These considerations, along with the fact that many nonOECD nations consider standards of living and political systems of the First World to be unachievable, may lead the developing world to identify with and derive images of their future from major Third World powers.

The Soft (but Dominating) Power of the EU

However, the opposite view on the role of the EU as a governance model is also found in literature. M. Leonard, for example, in his book Why Europe Will Run The 21st Century (2005) argues that the basis for American power (the ability to wage war trans-continentally and the ubiquity of American popular culture) has reached its natural limits. Against this he compares the European method of influence, which relies heavily on so-called ‘soft power’. In contrast to the previous study, he considers the European method as the more influential with the developing ‘BRIC’ nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).

The BRIC nations are more interested in the European model of capitalism delivering prosperity, security and greater levels of equality to its citizens. This contrasts to the US model where the winner takes all. The rising nations are encouraged by the way in which the EU has allowed tiny nations to leverage their influence. They can either join the EU or start their own regional association to overcome a ‘unipolar’ world. Eventually, the EU may be encouraged to develop a ‘Union of Unions’. It is in this way that Europe will run the 21st century.

Another example is J. Rifkin’s book about The European Dream (2004). In examining how the world will develop in the future, Rifkin, an enthusiastic advocate of the European model, notes that the market economy and the nation state are not designed for instant global communication and the networked world, which is already rapidly developing. Thus, he anticipates that the EU will develop decentralised and polycentric models of governance giving the EU the role of a rule-maker and gatekeeper rather than a governor and enforcer. The European model is being exported to other parts of the world replacing the crucible of US soft power as the ideal to which the world aspires. The European Dream expresses global connectivity without losing the sense of cultural identity and locality, freedom in relationships with others and the pursuit of quality of life, leading to the championing of human rights and the rights of nature.

The Role of the EU in Facing Global Challenges

The importance of the EU in the world is not seen only in political terms. Significant weight and responsibility is placed especially on facing global challenges and threats that go beyond national borders. Many foresight exercises point out the fact that future challenges (which are mostly not limited to a specific country) cannot – or at least not only – be addressed at a national level and, moreover, the supranational dimension and, in particular, the European dimension should be taken into account.

The FinnSight 2015 study states clearly that to implement Finland’s national vision as well as the positive impacts of scientific and technological development Finland needs to actively search for European and global partners. According to the French study Technologies-Clés 2010, it is not only necessary to take the European dimension into consideration, moreover the importance of national industry policies decreases in the globalised context.

Foresight exercises point out the following domains for which a common European answer to future challenges is necessary: ageing population; country differences in infrastructures; spatial and rural development/ environment and agriculture; competitiveness (for instance in the domain of information and communication technology it is only possible at the European level); energy (the successful promotion of wind energy for instance is only possible at the European level); security (nongovernmental and governmental action at a national as well as the international level has to be coordinated); social issues (challenges like social cohesion).

Safeguarding Socio-economic Growth

Interestingly, people see the success of the EU model of socioeconomic development as being both aspired to and threatened by the so-called global powers.

As the French FutuRIS study notes, the development of eastern and southern Asia will lead to major changes on the global geopolitical and economic map, which will modify the balance of power in the area of research and innovation. If Europe does not devote enough resources to this area, growth, which is already at risk of slowing down, will be compromised. This will leave Europe in a difficult position between Asia, with its dynamic growth, and the US, which is expected to continue to devote considerable resources to research and innovation. To provide a rough overview, world GERD is expected to rise from € 629 to € 1,320 billion over the next 20 years (on a constant euro basis), with the percentage claimed by the US down slightly from 36.6% to 33.0%, while Europe-15 will see its share fall from 22.3% to 17.5%. China will rise to 14.9% and industrial Asia to 24.1% (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia).

Other studies (Globalisation Trends, 2006) note the rapidly rising Chinese R&D intensity as well as the rapid development in sectors like motor vehicles. They warn that the complementarities (and thus less direct competition) that the EU now enjoys with China are fading away and that future trading conditions for European companies will be more demanding. On the other hand, they argue that Europe has no need to fear globalisation. Unlike the US and Japan, the EU has managed to maintain its dominant world market share position despite the emergence of countries such as China as major trading powers.

Referring to growth in the non-OECD economies the study Globalisation and Macroeconomic Policy (2007) argues that GDP growth will remain well above that in the OECD economies, reflecting higher productivity growth and more favourable demographic developments. Per capita output in the non-OECD economies is projected to rise by close to 5% per annum over the next two decades if globalisation continues at its current pace, compared with growth of 2% per annum in the OECD regions. Amongst the non-OECD countries, China and non-OECD Europe would enjoy the largest increases in per capita output.

EU to Lead International Cooperation

The scientific and technological aspect of the role of the EU is seen as of major importance for the future. Even more so international cooperation is highlighted. The SCOPE 2015 project, covering four regions of the world (countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] excluding Russia, Latin America excluding Brazil, Maghreb and Mashreq, and Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa), seeks to demonstrate the utility of foresight to EC policy makers and others concerned with cooperation with developing countries in research, technology and innovation.  The specific purpose of the project was to produce ten-year scenarios focused upon contextualised scientific and technological developments in selected regions of developing countries with a view to drawing implications for European research, technological development and innovation cooperation policy.

The study Emerging S+T Priorities in the Triadic Regions identifies scientific and technological developments and research priorities where Europe could take the lead in the years to come. Several strategies are proposed to prevent a decline of the European science and technology positioning in the eventuality of the Lisbon strategy failing, which are combined with the consolidation of current trends that emphasize economic factors for supporting research and innovation.

In addition, a number of foresight studies (like FISTERA or Transport and Mobility in an Enlarged Europe 2020) focus on examining the future of specific research fields and associated sectors on a European if not international scale.

Building the European Research Area

Another aspect of the role of the EU appearing in foresight studies is linked to the Lisbon and Barcelona objectives and the development of the European Research Area (ERA). For example, in the Ukrainian STI 2025 foresight exercise a clear orientation toward integration into the EU is deemed the best way for an effective modernization of the national science and technology system. The competitiveness imperative enshrined in the Lisbon Strategy is tackled in the exercise Imagineering Ireland – Future Scenarios for 2030: the future of Ireland is seen as being strongly linked with the future of the EU. A common integrated European policy in the maritime sector is the starting point of the exercise Malta Marine 2020. The foresight exercise East German Cross Border Regions, also considering cross-border regions in Poland and the Czech Republic, aims to initiate cross-border innovation strategies to further the development of the regional economy.
The analysis of the ERA dimension in the foresight exercises revealed that the Lisbon goals and raising the R&D intensity is a major concern in many foresight exercises. Due to the increasing R&D competition at the global scale, cooperation between research institutions – also beyond national borders – has become increasingly important.

Furthermore, several European scenarios have been developed as the basis for drawing up national or regional scenarios within foresight exercises. Yet, there are quite a few cases where the foresight exercise makes no connection to the European dimension and recommendations mainly focus on the local level of implementation.
This ‘myopia’ concerning the European dimension hardly comes unexpected given that national and sub-national
exercises are typically framed to address local settings. The social and cultural aspects of the EU’s role have rarely been a core feature examined in foresight studies. The social fabric of the EU states with their beliefs and needs has been of explicit concern to only a few exercises (Imagineering Ireland – Future Scenarios for 2030; Futur Radar 2030; Aufbruch Musik – German Music 2020). Though coming from different thematic backgrounds, they all broach the demise of traditional values,customs and beliefs and the need for developing new ones.

Conclusions

The interpretation of the challenge facing the EU in strengthening its importance worldwide includes a wide range of perspectives as expressed in the respective European Commission documents. From a first scan and analysis of relevant foresight studies it can be argued that this challenge is definitely not a core subject of discussion in foresight exercises. This is not surprising given their national, regional or local focus. However, upon close scrutiny, it can be claimed that the foresight studies do indeed cover all the different aspects and perspectives relevant to this challenge. Adopting a greater role worldwide is perceived as a necessity for the EU to successfully cope with the consequences associated with globalisation, the changing interactions between world regions and the rise of new global players. Accordingly, it is also seen as imperative for the EU to play a leading role in international cooperation to deal with global challenges. Some consider the European model as a suitable model of governance
for the developing world even though the success of the EU model of socio-economic development is being aspired to
and at the same time threatened by the so-called new rising global powers.

Authors: Effie Amanatidou amanatidou@atlantisresearch.gr
Type: Overview Brief
Date of Brief: February 2008

Sources and References

  • EFMN WP4 Team Report: Genesis of the EFMN issues short-list 2007, First Step: Analysis of EFMN Brief along ERA-related criteria.
  • European Commission, C(2007)2460 of 11 June 2007; SEC(2007) 1188 final, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/issues/article_5958_en.htm.
  • Leonard, M. (2005), Why Europe Will Run The 21st Century,Fourth Estate (book review by Stephen Aguilar-
    Millan / European Futures Observatory:http://www.eufo.org/index_files/Page631.htm).
  • Popper, R., Keenan, M., Miles, I., Butter, M., Sainz, G. (2007),EFMN Mapping Global Foresight Outlook 2007 Report.
  • Rifkin, J. (2004), The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American
    Dream, Polity Press, (book review by Stephen Aguilar-Millan/ European Futures Observatory: http://www.eufo.org/index_files/Page349.htm).
  • Rijkers-Defrasne, S., Korte, S., Pechmann, A., Amanatidou,E., Psarra, F. (2007), EFMN Issue Analysis Final Report 2007 – Emerging Knowledge-based Economy and Society.

Selection of foresight studies analysed
Finnish Committee for the Future – Democracy and Futures (2006); Global Trade Integration and Outsourcing (2006); Globalisation and Macroeconomic Policy (2007); Globalisation Trends
(2006).
Austrian BMVIT Safety and Security Research 2011; Danish Teknologisk Fremsyn 2020; East German Cross Border Regions; Emerging S+T Priorities in the Triadic Regions; FinnSight 2015; FISTERA; Foresight for Rural Ireland 2025; Futur Radar 2030; FutuRIS; German Music 2020; Imagineering Ireland
– Future Scenarios for 2030; Malta Marine 2020; SCOPE 2015 Project; Technologies Clés 2010; Transport and Mobility in an Enlarged Europe 2020; Ukrainian STI 2025.

Download: EFMN Brief No. 133_EU_’s_Role