Archive for the ‘Security’ Category

EFP Brief No. 248: Drivers, Trends and Grand Challenges in Security

Tuesday, January 29th, 2013

This brief gives an overview of the recent trends, drivers and ‘grand challenges’ in the area of security as they were iden-tified in the mapping and analysis of the 2nd EFP Mapping Report on Security Futures (Amanatidou et al., 2012). These findings were compiled from 16 different forward-looking activities (FLA), representing four types of FLA, namely: fore-sight, impact assessment, horizon scanning and forecasting. The selected FLA offer an interesting and complementary mix of national views and European perspectives.

Key global and European Security Issues

The concept of security has changed fundamentally over the last 25 years. The end of the cold war accompanied by a shift in global power distribution, failing states due to corruption, crime and religious fanaticism, risk of climate change and the interconnectedness of global hotspots giving rise to cyber-crime make the range of security challenges we are facing today and in the near future.

However, there is no clear separation between drivers, trends and ‘grand challenges’. The analysis of the original sources is not of a generic type but focuses on the security perspective. Some issues are mentioned in more than one group (as both trend and challenge, for instance) while some clustering would also make sense. This is attempted in this brief.

Globalisation is a major driver of evolutions with significant implications for security. Globalisation is likely to raise the level of interdependence between states and individuals within the globalised economy. Resources, trade, capital and intellectual property rely on complex networks of physical and virtual infrastructure that are likely to be vulnerable to physical disruption or cyber-attacks by multiple actors. Consequently, increasing dependency on this infrastructure, and the global supply chains that underpin globalisation, will leave the global economy vulnerable to disruption (DCDC 2010).

One of the main trends mentioned in the security FLAs is the emergence of new centres of power and the consequent redistribution of global power (EU-GRASP, NIC 2008). Associated to this is the shift of power to Asia as a major trend. In particular, the world of 2030 will be diffusely multipolar and polycentric. Polycentrism will be accompanied by an economic power shift toward Asia where over half of the world’s population will be concentrated by 2030. China is projected to be the largest economic power, and India will continue to rise. Both countries will face major structural challenges, however. Brazil may become a successful example of sustainable development during the next two decades. Russia and Japan will lose the great power status they enjoyed in the twentieth century (ESPAS 2012).

A constellation of rising middle powers, including Indonesia, Turkey and South Africa, will become ever more prominent (NIC 2008). The international system that is likely to emerge as a result of all these shifts will probably mix balance-of-power politics and multilateralism, with states making issue-by-issue shifts and alliances. This will generate a higher level of unpredictability in international relations and make it harder to attain a broad consensus even on matters requiring urgent global action (ESPAS 2012). This shift of global power is likely to result in a period of instability in international relations, accompanied by the possibility of intense competition between major powers as there will be several states and institutions competing for regional and global influence, cooperating and competing within the international community (DCDC 2010).

The grand challenges addressed in the security FLAs are climate change, scarcities, global inequalities, changing demographics and migration.

Climate change has a central position in the analysis of trends and challenges. Temperature increases are likely to lead to significant environmental change that may, for example, include desertification in the Saharan margins and changes to rainfall distribution patterns within the monsoon belt of the Arabian Sea and South Asia. The frequency and intensity of extreme weather events will change, possibly with severe impact on low-lying coastal regions. Rapid glacial melt, particularly in the Himalayas, may exacerbate water management problems in China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Disease carriers, such as malarial mosquitoes, are likely to spread into previously temperate zones (DCDC 2010).

Special reference is being made to the consequences of climate change affecting living standards and public safety by exacerbating water and food scarcity with environmental degradation expected to continue to provoke humanitarian disasters, including desertification and floods of increasing magnitude. The severest impact will be felt in China, South Asia and the Sahel where millions of people will be displaced; but no region of the world will be spared (ESPAS 2012).

Scarcity in energy, food and fresh water resources is also separately addressed in relation to the social unrest and conflicts they may cause. The frequency, scale and duration of humanitarian crises are likely to increase. Many states, including China and India, are likely to become more dependent on food imports to feed their large and increasingly affluent populations. A shift in agricultural patterns and the distribution of grain growing areas, coupled with the rise in animal and plant diseases, is likely to disrupt food production, resulting in increased migration. However, improvements and efficiencies in agricultural production are likely to meet much of the increased demand, given likely scientific advances that develop high-yield, disease resistant crop strains, combined with better land usage and improved irrigation. Humanitarian crises due to water scarcity and related food and health emergencies may become recurrent, particularly in some parts of Africa. Competition for resources is likely to exacerbate tensions and trigger conflicts. Energy crises will heighten the sense that the world is entering an ‘age of scarcity’, putting the prevailing model of development into question (ESPAS 2012).

Inequalities of opportunities is another grand challenge due to globalisation and increased access to more readily and cheaply available telecommunications. This type of inequality is likely to be a significant source of grievance, possibly resulting in an increased incidence of conflict. However, states that experience lower birth rates and increased longevity are likely to benefit from a growing workforce and a falling dependency ratio. The result is a ‘demographic dividend’, which can produce a virtuous cycle of growth (DCDC 2010).

Demographic trends are also mentioned among the grand challenges as possible causes of tensions. Demographic trends may fuel instability especially in the Middle East, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The developing world will account for most of the growth, remaining relatively youthful, in contrast to the developed world and China, which will experience little population growth and undergo significant increases in median age. In the West, however, ageing is likely to lead to policies to employ the ‘younger old’. This cultural shift may yield a second demographic dividend leading to a lower demand for migrant workers and decreasing the social welfare burden. (DCDC 2010) The populations of several youth-bulge states are projected to remain on rapid growth trajectories. Unless employment conditions change dramatically in parlous youth-bulge states, such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen, these countries will remain ripe for continued instability and state failure (NIC 2008).

Nevertheless, populations in many affluent societies are likely to decline, encouraging economic migration from less wealthy regions. Environmental pressures, economic incentives and political instability will continue to drive population movement from afflicted regions. Conflict and crises will also continue to displace large numbers of people. Such movement is likely to occur in regions of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (DCDC 2010).

In terms of responses to humanitarian crises, we will witness a world characterised by the diffusion of power. Meeting the challenges of human development will depend increasingly on non-state actors, be they private companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or philanthropic institutions. Non-state actors, in particular national and transnational civil society networks and private corporations, will play a critical role in the coming decades. Their power and influence will be greater than that of many states and may lead to new forms of governance and civic action. But not all contributions by private actors will be positive: extremist non-state actors are likely to present a threat to the well-being of human communities (ESPAS 2012).

The rising power of non-state actors vis-à-vis the state is a central theme examined from several perspectives. Concurrent with the shift in power among nation-states, the relative power of various non-state actors—including businesses, tribes, religious organisations and criminal networks—is increasing. The global political coalition of non-state actors plays a crucial role in securing a new worldwide climate change agreement. In this new connected world of digital communications, growing middle classes and transnational interest groups, politics is no longer local and domestic, and international agendas become increasingly interchangeable (NIC 2008).

The impacts from the empowerment of individual and non-state actors are addressed. In democratic societies, new forms of protest and anti-establishment politics may emerge in response to a growing expectations gap, deepening income disparities and the power shifts that are limiting the action of countries that have been used to acting as major global players. From the security perspective, it is expected that over the next two decades the cyber sphere is likely to become an arena of conflict and tension between states of all political stripes and also between individuals or private companies.

The examination of the role of the individual in future societies goes even further, indicating that the citizens of 2030 will be much more aware of being part of a single human community in a highly interconnected world. This may signal the rise of a new ‘age of convergence.’ Democratic aspirations will tend to be perceived as compatible with, even as facilitating, a greater awareness of national and sub-national cultural identities (ESPAS 2012).

The role of women is also examined. Over the next 20 years, the increased entry and retention of women in the workplace may continue to mitigate the economic impacts of global aging. Examples as disparate as Sweden and Rwanda indicate that countries with relatively large numbers of politically active women place greater importance on societal issues such as healthcare, the environment and economic development. If this trend continues over the next 15-20 years, as is likely, an increasing number of countries could favour social programs over military ones. Better governance also could be a spinoff benefit, as a high number of women in parliament or senior government positions correlates with lower corruption (NIC 2008).

The current economic crisis is referred to as a driver that may reverse the trend of decreasing inequalities due to the emergence of a middle class in Asia, Latin America and also Africa. Overall, however, inequality will tend to increase and poverty and social exclusion will still affect a significant proportion of the world population (DCDC 2010). At the same time, increasing social and economic pressures may undermine liberal institutions and the long-term prospects for greater democratisation (NIC 2008).

The proliferation of modern weapons’ technologies will generate instability and shift the military balance of power in various regions. Nuclear weapons are likely to proliferate. Terrorist groups are likely to acquire and use chemical, biological and radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons possibly through organised crime groups (DCDC 2010), but a major conflagration involving CBRN weapons is not likely to happen over the next two decades (ESPAS 2012, NIC 2008).

The possibility of inter-state conflict cannot be discounted entirely. Looking ahead to 2030, the border tensions between China and India over water resources have the greatest potential to disrupt international peace. Conflicts are also foreseen due to current tensions between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara, the problems emerging as a result of the possible collapse of North Korea, and unresolved conflicts in Eastern Europe. Tensions over raw materials may also cause conflict and require new forms of crisis management. Intra-African and trans-regional forced migration due to economic factors, conflicts and environmental degradation will tend to grow. Wars fuelled by nationalism and extremist identity politics, and the associated dangers of mass murder and genocide, will be among the core security challenges of the coming decades (ESPAS 2012).

Despite the emergence of a possible ‘age of convergence’, ideologically driven conflicts are another form that continues to exist. The social tensions caused by intrusive global culture are likely to be most acute amongst those who seek to maintain their indigenous and traditional customs and beliefs, and feel threatened by changes. This is likely to lead to an increasing number of individuals and groups forming around single issues that differentiate them from wider society and becoming marginalised and possibly radicalised. When such conditions exist, particularly when exacerbated by high levels of marginalisation and social exclusion, sections of the populace will develop grievances that may lead to extremism (DCDC 2010).

Urbanisation is also seen as an important trend. By 2040, around 65%, or 6 billion, of the world’s population will live in urban areas, attracted by access to jobs, resources and security. The greatest increases in urbanisation will occur in Africa and Asia. As up to 2 billion people may live in slums, these areas are likely to become centres of criminality and disaffection and may also be focal points for extremist ideologies. Rapid urbanisation is likely to lead to an increased probability of urban, rather than rural, insurgency (DCDC 2010).

In addition, megacities are also highlighted as possible sources of conflicts as well as important future players. By 2030, the fifty greatest megacities in the world will concentrate more resources than most small and middle-income states, and they will demand more autonomy and exert greater power, even taking on a more prominent international role. Preserving humane living conditions in the world’s megacities will be the major challenge facing some states. Cities will also absorb most national security resources (ESPAS 2012).

Trends in innovation and technology are also being examined especially for solutions to the major trends and challenges mentioned above. Technology will provide partial solutions for both adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. However, it is unlikely that, by 2040, technology will have produced low emission energy sources capable of providing the majority of the energy demanded. Nevertheless, advances in carbon capture technology are likely to be significant, allowing fossil fuel usage to continue in a limited emission regime using more coal. Despite this, resource competition, carbon pricing, increased energy demand and the limitations imposed by climate change are likely to increase the cost of fossil fuels, stimulating the development of cleaner, renewable energy solutions and nuclear power (DCDC 2010).

However, from a security perspective, technology will also facilitate the organisation of protests and high impact terrorist attacks. The future global environment will be defined by physical, social and virtual networks. The physical system will consist of complex interconnections, including extensive resource pipelines, communication cables, satellites and travel routes. The virtual networks will consist of communications servers linking individuals and objects, many of which will be networked through individual Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Avenues for protest and opportunities for new and old forms of crime will emerge and may allow hostile groups to form and rapidly create effect (DCDC 2010).

In terms of defence technologies, many states are likely to develop ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering CBRN weapons as well as conventional payloads (DCDC 2010). The majority of the technological breakthroughs are likely to be driven by the commercial sector, although technological adaptation in defence will continue at a rapid pace. Nonlethal, directed energy weapons (DEW), space and cyber technologies will be available to a wide variety of actors, both state and non-state (DCDC 2010).

Finally, there is growing demand for multilateral policies in the global and regional arenas for an increasing number of issues from the fight against climate change to disease control. There is, therefore, need for more multilateralism and, arguably, for a larger European role (EU-GRASP).

The Way Forward in European Security Research

In several studies, recommendations address a number of grand challenges from a security perspective, for instance, in the field of energy, the environment or migration. FORESEC, for example, recommends developing a common EU energy security strategy – energy policy is still driven by national-level approaches. FORESEC also recommends a dialogue with the security and intelligence services across the EU as useful input in formulating counter-terrorism legislation at the EU level.

EU-GRASP places special emphasis on the role of the EU in a multi-polar world and recommends that the EU adapt to changing global multilateralism. The EU must be steady in promoting multilateralism as an ideal but extremely flexible in its multilateral practice; it must find ways to engage with legitimate sub-national, multinational and transnational non-state actors and their networks.

In its recommendations, the NATO Security Jam study (Dowdall 2012) focuses on security issues of global concern, managing relations with emerging powers such as establishing a NATO-China Council (NCC) similar to the NATO-Russia Council.

SANDERA produced a long list of suggestions for further research. One suggestion regards the analysis of the portfolio of policy instruments at the EU level in view of defining the potential for strengthening European synergy in defence research.

FORESEC repeats the importance of researching certain definitional and analytical aspects of security (i.e. on societal aspects of security, unintentional threats, external dimension of security and its link to internal security, cultural aspects of terrorism, societal resilience and cultural and social identity). In addition, it suggests assessing impacts of certain challenges on security, i.e. vulnerability of societies in the EU, migration and demographic shifts and security, climate change and security, urbanisation and security.

EFP Mapping Results represent a major step forward in the successful implementation of a new mapping framework (SMART Futures Jigsaw) capable of providing customised forward-looking research and innovation policy intelligence on a wide range of sectors, such as security. Both the Mapping Environment (a web-based platform available online at www.mappingforesight.eu) and our mapping work (1st, 2nd and 3rd EFP Mapping Reports) demonstrate the commitment of EFP to the mapping of FLA practices, players and outcomes. Thus, our FLA mapping work will almost certainly continue beyond EFP.

Authors: Effie Amanatidou         effie.amanatidou@mbs.ac.uk                   Rafael Popper             rafael.popper@mbs.ac.uk                         Thomas Teichler thomas.teichler@technopolis-group.com
Sponsors: n.a.
Type: Thematic overview on security
Organizer: MIoIR/MBS, University of Manchester
Duration: n.a.
Budget: n.a.
Time Horizon: 2020-2050
Date of Brief: December 2012

Download EPF Brief No. 248_Drivers, Trends and Grand Challenges in Security

Sources and References

Amanatidou et al. (2012): 2nd EFP Mapping Report on Security Futures. Towards a Fully-Fledged Futures Mapping: Results of Mapping 16 FLA on Security, available for download at http://www.foresight-platform.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Deliverable_2-4_2nd_EFP_Mapping_Report_Security_Futures.pdf

DCDC – Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2010): Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040, available for download at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33717/GST4_v9_Feb10.pdf

Dowdall, Jonathan (2012): The new global security landscape. 10 Recommendations from the 2012 Security Jam, available for download at http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org

ESPAS – European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (2012): Global Trends 2030 – Citizens in an interconnected and polycentric world, available for download at http://www.espas.europa.eu/home/

EU-GRASP, http://www.eugrasp.eu/, last access 15 January 2013

NIC – National Intelligence Council (2008): Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, available for download at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf

EFP Brief No. 236: Assessing Dutch Defence Needs Follow-up

Friday, December 21st, 2012

Under the influence of (inter)national technological, political and economic developments, the Dutch defence industry is increasingly intertwined with and developing towards a civilian industry. Consequently, the political responsibilities, atti-tudes and criteria are changing for both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. An analysis of the Dutch defence industry helped to determine the main opportunities for innovation in the industry and to identify the com-plementary technological competences needed to make the most of them. A strategic vision, including options for innova-tion policy, was developed as well. In this follow-up brief, we reiterate the background, approach and results of the initial foresight study and describe its impact in the years to follow.

Transition of Defence

Historically, “defence” supports national strategy, in which nations have built their own forces, defence industry and knowledge infrastructure. Consequently, within nations there arose a demand driven chain with a solid and confidential relationship between the parties in a closed chain, also discerning the industry from ‘civil’ industries. However, technological, political and economic developments in the last twenty years are changing defence radically. Issues such as the end of the Cold War, decreasing budgets, international cooperation, international organization of forces, industries and knowledge infrastructure, growing use of civil technologies, civil industries and civil markets, ‘the war on terrorism’, and homeland defence have entered the stage. Consequently, the political responsibilities, attitudes and measurements are changing for both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, while the defence industry and knowledge infrastructure is increasingly intertwined and developing towards a civil industry and knowledge infrastructure. This critical transition of the defence chain demands timely strategic information and a vision to anticipate effectively. For ministries this means a clear view on responsibilities, effective investment strategies for a capable future force and an effective industry and innovation policy. The defence industry increasingly has to deter-mine their most favourable innovative possibilities.

Developing a New Strategic Vision

As a result, the ministries wanted to assess four is-sues/developments and formed working groups to prepare the strategy. Four groups were formed to

– Inventory the relevant international developments,

– determine success factors of international cooperation in procurement,

– determine priority technological areas for the defence industry which are for interest for the domestic market, and

– policy instruments to strengthen the strategic vision.

The third question concerning the identification of priority technological areas was the core issue in this project and divided into four sub questions:

  1. What are the current strengths of the Dutch defence industry?
  2. What are international opportunities for innovation in the defence market?

Structural Approach Based on Clusters

The challenge of the exercise was to systematically translate the four sub questions into perspectives on technological clusters or innovation opportunities. This makes the outcomes comparable. Every perspective was analysed and then translated into a codified taxonomy of technologies developed by the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG); this WEAG-classification on defence technologies is generally accepted within the defence sector. This taxonomy includes technology, products and intelligence or as they are called ‘underpinning technologies’, ‘systems-related technologies’ and ‘military assessments, equipment and functions’.

Additionally, the WEAG-classes were checked for interrelation such that priority clusters are formed and interpreted, which seem to combine specific technologies with products and intelligence. Finally, these priority clusters are compared such that a final reflection is made from the four different perspectives (see figure 1).

For determining the strengths of the defence industry, companies were analysed and a computer aided workshop including the industry was organized (Group Decision Room). The innovative opportunities were inventoried based on desk re-search and interviews with leading parties. Future needs of the military forces were inventoried and weighted based on al-ready planned investments by the Ministry of Defence. Finally, the civil market was assessed by experts based on most relevant societal challenges.

Below the analysis on current strengths is elaborated. For foresight purposes, the results on innovative opportunities are also included.

Outcomes: New Paradigm of Effectiveness

Military operations are increasingly operations other than war, such as peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance and other military support to civil authorities. Consequently, governments turned their focus on the ultimate goal of ‘effect-based [security] operations’. In practice, effect-based operations imply a joint and combined cooperation between different armies and forces resulting in a transformation of a plat-form-centric force into a network-centric force. The term “network-centric warfare” or “network enabled operations” broadly describes the combination of emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive advantage. On the whole, the defence sector still innovates on platforms, weaponry and increasingly on intelligence. Figure 3 below shows all innovation themes which are on the agenda of the defence sector.

Innovation themes are divided into underlying innovative opportunities, translated in the WEAG-classification and finally clusters are identified. The main clusters are C4I, sensor systems and integrated system design and development.

Information Based Services

The clusters arising from the four perspectives are compared with each other to identify the main clusters. Table 3 below shows the synthesis.

Type 1 clusters can be regarded as broad, strong clusters, with a good industry base and market potential in domestic, inter-national and civil markets. This first type of cluster represents information based services for the Dutch industry. Type 2 clusters cover a couple of interesting niche markets. Finally, type 3 clusters are fragmented but might have some niches.

Original Brief Impact Discussion

In the 2007 brief, some of the impact of the foresight study was already visible and described:

The project was on a highly political trajectory, where the interests of industry and the ministries of Defence and Economic Affairs were intertwined. Also being a part of a broader process and the project delivering the content for just one of four working groups led to intensive discussions within the interdepartmental group before the results could be used as input to the national strategy for the defence industry. This, together with the change of government, considerably prolonged the finalization of the strategy.

About one year after the finalization of the project, the ministries determined their Defence industry strategy. The results of the project were largely integrated into the strategy and therefore had a high impact. The technological priorities stated were fully accepted and provided the backbone to the suggested defence innovation policy. The strategy was discussed in Parliament and will be part of the national policy on the defence industry.

A Follow-up Foresight Study

As noted, the results from the 2006 foresight exercise were integrated in the Dutch Defense Industry Strategy of 2007. However, since 2007 the strategic context in which this industry sector operates has changed significantly. New forms of conflict arise, that demand new kinds of response (e.g. cyberdefense), closer cooperation with coalition partners requires further integration of systems, the financial crisis has had an impact on defense budgets, and finally there is a clear movement to an open and transparent European defense market.

These strategic changes has prompted the Dutch Defense Ministry to evaluate the Defense Industry Strategy that was formulated in 2007. A key part of this evaluation is a follow-up foresight exercise to the foresight exercise of 2006 described earlier in this brief. In the original foresight exercise, research was done on three questions with regards to the Dutch Defense Industry: (1) what is the Dutch Defense Industry good in? (2) What does the market need? (3) What does Dutch Defense need? Questions 1 and 2 were sufficiently answered, but changes in the strategic context require an update to these answers. The answer to 3 was less detailed, and still required a more extensive study.

This follow-up foresight exercise is planned for 2012, and will be performed by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and TNO. It aims to examine whether the identified technology clusters are still relevant, whether they need to be adjusted to extended, considering the developments in the last 5 years. The approach is mostly similar to the one of the previous foresight exercise.

Several other forward looking activities in the past 5 years provide key input for the follow-up foresight study, including an exploration to the Dutch Defense force of the future (Dutch Ministry of Defense, 2010), and a NATO study into the future of joint operations (NATO, 2011).

The follow-up foresight study will be shaped along three main topics:

Needs: the future needs of the Dutch defense are investigated, including innovation characteristics of (new) required capacities, attention to the speeding-up of the lifecycle of innovations and capacities, and the role of defense in this lifecycle of capacities and innovations.

Strengths: the strengths of the Dutch defense industry are analyzed using datasets gathered yearly by other organizations using interviews and surveys with industry organizations.

Opportunities: in interviews and focus group sessions the estimates that the Dutch defense industry make about their own future opportunities are analyzed. This analysis is accompanied by an international comparison and a separate analysis by the organizations performing the follow-up foresight exercise.

In a synthesis phase, representatives from ministries, industry and knowledge institutions will be brought together in a workshop session, in which the final conclusions and recommendations of the study will be formulated.

Conclusions

The foresight exercise described in the original brief had a high level of impact in a specific area: the Dutch Defense Industry Strategy. The study results have proven to be useful in formulating a defense industry strategy by the relevant ministries. This usefulness is further illustrated by the fact that a follow-up study was requested and has been initiated, which is expected to provide input for an update to the defense industry strategy.

Authors: Bas van Schoonhoven                                   bas.vanschoonhoven@tno.nl

Annelieke van der Giessen                 annelieke.vandergiessen@tno.nl

 
Sponsors: Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Dutch Ministry of Defence  
Type: Single foresight exercise  
Geographic coverage: National (Netherlands)
Organizer: TNO – The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (www.tno.nl)
Duration: Jan/Jul 2006 Budget: € 150,000 Time Horizon: 2015    
Date of original brief: Oct. 2007     Date of follow-up brief: Oct. 2012    

 

Download EFP Brief No. 236_Assessing Dutch Defence Needs_Follow-up.

Sources and References

Butter, M, J.H.A. Hoogendoorn, A. Rensma and A. van der Giessen (2006), “The Dutch Defence Outlook”, TNO.

Hoogendoorn J.H.A., Rensma A., Butter M., van der Giessen A., (2007), “Opportunities in Innovation for the Dutch Defence Industry”, EFMN Foresight Brief No. 120, available online at
http://www.foresight-platform.eu/briefs-resources/

(Dutch) Dutch Ministry of Defense, 2010, Eindrapport – Verkenningen: Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst
http://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2010/03/29/46153012/strategische_verkenningen_bij_defensie_afgerond

NATO, 2011, Joint Operations 2030 – Final Report
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545152

EFP Brief No. 228: Visions for Horizon 2020 from Copenhagen Research Forum

Friday, November 23rd, 2012

In January 2012, the Copenhagen Research Forum (CRF) gathered 80 European scientists to discuss the societal chal-lenges to be addressed by Horizon 2020, the next framework programme for European research and innovation, and consider how research could contribute the best solutions. This EFP brief explains the process behind the CRF and gives a summary of recommendations. It ends with a discussion on cross-disciplinarity and strategic partnerships as tools for organising research in order to solve complex societal challenges.

Visions for Horizon 2020 – from Copenhagen Research Forum

The EU Commission’s proposal for a new framework programme, Horizon 2020, is devoted to strengthening the strategic organisation of European research and innovation. The ambition is to mobilise excellent scientists across various branches of knowledge in order to provide solutions for complex societal challenges.

The Copenhagen Research Forum (CRF) set out to assemble a broad spectrum of leading European scientists to give their view on the Commission’s choice of societal challenges and possible ways of implementing Horizon 2020 as a means of tackling them. Approximately 600 scientists contributed throughout the process.

The CRF recommendations clearly affirm the EU Commission’s selection of societal challenges as well as the idea of supporting cross-disciplinary collaboration as a means to address crosscutting problems within and across challenges. The recommendations also send a strong signal of support for a framework where excellence, cross-disciplinarity and simplicity in administrative processes are key components.

The following pages provide an overview of the process behind the CRF, the main recommendations as well as a discussion of new instruments to be implemented to support cross-disciplinarity.

The CRF Process

The main idea behind CRF was to involve a broad spectrum of Europe’s top-level researchers in the making of Horizon 2020 since part of its preparation would take place during the Danish EU presidency in the first half of 2012.

The University of Copenhagen, Technical University of Denmark and the Capital Region of Denmark wanted the scientific community to provide unbiased input to Horizon 2020, with the aim of making Horizon 2020 as attractive as possible to researchers working in the areas covered by the six societal challenges. Professor Liselotte Højgaard was appointed as Chair of CRF.

The concept was finalised in the summer of 2011. The key issue was that CRF should convey ideas, visions and comments from outstanding researchers, all of whom were invited personally to join CRF. A full list of names of conference participants may be found in the CRF report (see link on the last page).

The process comprised several steps and organisational roles:

Chairship – This involved contacting researchers for the six groups and establishing a chairship comprised of one Dane and one European researcher for each challenge:

  • Health: Professor Liselotte Højgaard MD, DMSc and Professor Deborah Smith.
  • Food & Agriculture: Professor Peter Olesen and Director Kees de Gooijer.
  • Energy: Dr. Jørgen Kjems and Professor Kjell Hugo Bendiksen.
  • Transport: Head of Dept. Niels Buus Kristensen and Programme Director Dr. Christian Piehler.
  • Climate & Resources: Professor Katherine Richardson and Professor Johan Rockström.
  • Society: Professor Ole Wæver and Professor Loet Leydesdorff.

The six panel chairships were asked to invite up to 100 researchers to offer their views in a virtual discussion forum. Out of the invitees, 15 researchers from each group were also asked to meet at a workshop conference in Copenhagen on 16 January 2012 shortly after the Danish EU presidency began.

Virtual discussion forum – Divided equally between the six societal challenges, the 600 researchers were invited to comment on the draft text of Horizon 2020. The researchers were asked to contribute personal visions for the future as well as point out needs and possible solutions. They were also asked to suggest and comment on the technologies and the priorities within the given challenge as well as consider the instruments and implementation needed to ensure success as seen from a scientific perspective. Lastly, they were requested to contribute their ideas on how to secure the link between research and the innovation perspective stressed in Horizon 2020. All of the input was collected in a draft report that formed the basis of the aforementioned conference in Copenhagen.

Conference – On 16 January 2012, the six panels met and discussed the draft report, offering comments and adding new ideas inspired by the input collected in the virtual discussion forum. The aim was to reach agreement on (1) the views and recommendations in each of the six panels, (2) a joint statement during plenary sessions expressing the view on scientific issues cutting across all six challenges and (3) recommendations for the implementation of a challenge-oriented framework as a basis for excellent research and far-reaching solutions.

The Danish Minister of Science, Innovation and Higher Education, Morten Østergaard, attended the conference.

Outcome – The conference resulted in a condensed report offering ideas and solutions that could help form Horizon 2020 from a scientific point of view. The conclusions were presented to the European community in an open dialogue as explained in the following.

Dissemination – The CRF recommendations were presented to the EU Council of Ministers’ meeting in Copenhagen on 1 February 2012 and subsequently to the European Commission, the European Parliament as well as directly to Director General for DG Research and Innovation, Robert Jan Smits. The dissemination activities were closely connected to the Danish EU presidency.

In the following section, we provide key statements from the CRF panels’ recommendations. A full version can be found in the report.

Key CRF Recommendations for Each Societal Challenge

Health, Demographic Change and Wellbeing
  • Biomedical research and its implementation in clinical practice must be supported and accelerated. This requires a paradigm shift towards personalised medicine.
  • The global revolution in biomedicine is providing new technologies. Utilising those technologies requires vast efforts to expand and implement them.
  • A European platform engaging all key stakeholders to ensure discovery and delivery of these technologies will be crucial.
  • Establishment of a European Strategic Action for Healthier Citizens is also recommended to assist in strategic long-term healthcare research and planning, including preventive measures and the spread of best practice across Europe.

Food Security, Sustainable Agriculture, Marine and Maritime Research and the Bio-economy

  • Overriding challenges of increasing demand, competition for land use and other resource scarcities create massive pressure to produce significantly more per unit of a given resource.
  • Food, agriculture and land use must be seen in a complex and multi-directional value chain encompassing climate, available resources, environmental sustainability, transport, energy and health perspectives, not to mention social and economic requirements.
  • Key objectives are reductions in food waste and water consumption, valorisation of all bio-resources, including municipal bio-waste and agro- and bio-industrial side streams as well as the recycling of sufficient amounts of carbon and phosphor to maintain soil vitality.
  • Increasing prevalence of diet-related diseases and disorders calls for a balanced healthcare concept more geared towards prevention.
  • There is a need to create a collaborative innovation culture linking researchers, companies (especially SMEs), university education, NGOs and governments.
Secure, Clean and Efficient Energy
  • Horizon 2020 priorities should build on (1) a revised Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan), including a critical update of technology road maps and (2) a new, complementary systemic approach to combine technological, economical, political, social and cultural research to facilitate the transformation of the energy system as a whole.
  • Collaboration of social sciences and humanities with ‘hard sciences’ must be recognised as necessary and organised and funded accordingly to meet the challenges at the system level.
  • Coupling of educational efforts with research and innovation is critical for realising the ambitious plans for technology implementation and the overall system transition agenda.
  • Direct mobilisation of universities in addressing systemic challenges should be given high priority.
Smart, Green and Integrated Transport
  • The complexity of transport challenges requires closer cooperation across scientific domains and integration across universities, research institutions and industry than in the past.
  • Meeting the challenge of developing smart and green transport systems requires not only technological solutions but also a better understanding of transport behaviour and the use of innovative and effective policy instruments.
  • This calls for a more pronounced role for the social sciences than in previous framework programmes as well as for strengthening the integration of scientific domains.
  • Technological innovation will still be of paramount importance, including cleaner and safer vehicles for all transportation modes, cost-effective alternative fuels, advanced ICT for personalised real-time travel information with modal integration, metropolitan traffic management and smart payment systems.


Climate Action,Resource Efficiency and Raw Materials
  • Climate change constitutes one of the most urgent global resource challenges facing society, where the resource in question is our atmosphere as a receptacle for greenhouse gas wastes.
  • Development of actions and strategies for dealing with this challenge can potentially provide models for dealing with resource scarcity issues (biodiversity, ecosystem services, water, phosphorous, ores and metals etc.).
  • A general paradigm for dealing with resource scarcity is reducing the need for – and more efficient use of – the resource, combined with the adaptation of human activities to changed conditions and/or the recognition of resource scarcity.
  • In dealing with resource scarcity in general and the climate in particular, a major challenge is to channel the knowledge gained on the mechanisms of the Earth’s system into political and societal action. This requires cross-disciplinary approaches that integrate natural sciences with other disciplines.
  • The focus of Horizon 2020 should thus be to underpin societal responses to climate challenges by including research on systemic interaction, collecting baseline information and establishing monitoring activities of different mitigation and adaptation approaches.
Inclusive, Innovative and Secure Societies
  • The focus on ‘inclusive, innovative and secure societies’ provides a highly welcome challenge to the social sciences and humanities (SSH).
  • The Horizon 2020 proposal tends to focus on ‘hard’ technologies, especially statistics, assessments and measures of efficiency (evidence-based lessons), with a corresponding tendency to employ a technocratic definition of the nature of the challenges (e.g. in the security part, critical infrastructure protection is prioritised over international politics).
  • This represents a limited political and social vision that underestimates the power of citizens and communities to contribute to the realisation of inclusion, innovation and security.
  • Corresponding to a vision comprising a broader mobilisation of societal energies are forms of research that employ a wider selection of methodologies and theories to study the dynamics of society as productive and generative, rather than as the site of problems to be solved.
  • SSH can play key roles in the other societal challenges as well. It is important that researchers in the SSH engage scholars in the hard sciences in a joint effort to cultivate research-based innovation regarding the way expertise and democracy interact.

Excellence,Cross-disciplinarity and Simplicity

The ambition of using societal challenges as a means to organise European research requires new approaches. The message from CRF is to pursue this through a combination of excellence, cross-disciplinarity and administrative simplicity.

The CRF report signals a strong will among scientists to enter into cross-disciplinary collaborations in order to address complex challenges for which no single discipline has the solution. But this must not violate an equally strong need for administrative simplification and a continued effort to support excellence in all research activities. Without excellence as a fundamental requirement in all programmes, the cross-disciplinary ambition may become a hollow and strange add-on to ‘real’ science. Whenever a problem calls for a disciplinary approach, this should not be substituted with cross-disciplinarity. Timely application of new approaches must be a key priority.

Strategic Partnerships as Tools for Organising Cross-disciplinary Collaboration?

One of the ways in which cross-disciplinarity may enter the Horizon 2020 programme could be by establishing strategic partnerships devoted to delivering solutions to complex challenges. Strategic partnerships could be a way for the Horizon 2020 programme to nurture new constellations of fields of expertise without establishing very detailed road maps or other guidelines ‘from above’. It would be important to involve industrial and civil society actors in the formulation of strategic objectives in order to ensure that strategic partnerships become platforms for linking strategic priorities from science, policy, industry and other actors and that these partnerships organise collaboration accordingly.

A key feature of implementing strategic partnerships should be to provide them with sufficient operational freedom so as to secure flexibility and entrepreneurship in how partnerships pursue their goals at the project level.

Strategic partnerships should be an invitation and challenge to European research to explore new models of collaboration. This corresponds also with a clear recommendation from the CRF advocating the setup of strategic platforms connecting long-term visions with mid- and short-term investments in a dynamic way.

The advantage of a partnership-based organisation of strategic research is that it allows coordinating a variety of fields and actors while creatively linking actors who would otherwise not establish collaborative ties. Coordination and connection are thus key aspects of well-functioning strategic partnerships – but only if the model builds on principles that afford strategic partnerships sufficient degrees of freedom in organising collaboration projects. Otherwise, the risk of reproducing fragmentation and the resulting problems known from FP7 cooperation will be substantial.

The CRF epitomises an interest among scientists to engage in shaping the framework conditions of research and innovation. Beyond the scope of specific recommendations, the CRF may serve as a source of inspiration for how to establish a direct dialogue between the scientific community and policymakers.

The CRF report was followed up by a ‘CRF II’ process during which the chairship of CRF put together a set of recommendations for the implementation of Horizon 2020 in light of the CRF report. The resulting paper (Højgaard, L. et al. [2012a]) focuses on recommendations for implementing measures to promote excellence, cross-disciplinarity, simplicity and impact. The recommendations for implementation along with the CRF report can be found at the CRF homepage (crf2012.org).

Authors: Brenneche, Nicolaj Tofte                   ntb.lpf@cbs.dk

Højgaard, Liselotte      liselotte.hoejgaard@regionh.dk

Sponsors: Capital Region of Denmark

Technical University of Denmark

University of Copenhagen

Type: European research and innovation policy, Horizon 2020
Organizer: Capital Region of Denmark, Technical University of Denmark, University of Copenhagen

Contact: Anne Line Mikkelsen, amik@adm.dtu.dk

Duration: 2011 – 2012
Budget: n.a.
Time Horizon: 2020
Date of Brief: November 2012

Download: EFP Brief No. 228_Visions for Horizon 2020.

Sources and References

Højgaard, L. et al (2012): Visions for Horizon 2020 – from Copenhagen Research Forum.

Højgaard, L. et al (2012a): Copenhagen Research Forum II. Recommendations for an optimized implementation of Horizon 2020.

Both are available at www.crf2012.org.

EFP Brief No. 225: FESTOS – Foresight of Evolving Security Threats Posed by Emerging Technologies

Tuesday, October 23rd, 2012

New technologies can improve our quality of life greatly, but they may also have a “dark side”. The objectives of FESTOS were to identify and assess evolving security threats posed by the potential abuse of emerging technologies and new scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and propose means to reduce the likelihood of such threats, on the other. Looking ahead to the year 2030, this foresight study scanned the horizon of different fields of technology. Possible means of prevention and policy measures were studied in the context of trade-offs between security needs and the freedom of research and knowledge.

Emerging Technologies
Pose New Threats to Security

The FESTOS project (Foresight of Evolving Security Threats Posed by Emerging Technologies) identified and assessed evolving security threats caused by the abuse or inadequate use of emerging technologies and areas of applied research. Looking ahead to the year 2035, FESTOS scanned the horizon of fields such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, robotics, new materials, and information technology, as well as capabilities that might emerge from converging technologies.

FESTOS identified and evaluated these potential threats on the horizon. Based on this scanning, FESTOS stimulated “out of the box”, forward-looking thinking and constructed “threat scenarios”. Finally, FESTOS recommended policy guidelines designed to minimise the probability of these evolving security threats materialising. Possible means of prevention and policy measures were studied in the light of trade-offs between security needs and the freedom of research and knowledge while taking into account shifts in the public perception of threats and related security issues.

Three Pillars of the Project

FESTOS had three pillars:

  1. To identify new, potentially threatening technologies.
  2. To assess emerging threats and – based on a selected set of potential threats – to construct scenarios with appropriate early-warning indicators.
  3. To draft preparatory measures and policy guidelines.

As all foresight studies, FESTOS did not aim to predict the future. Instead, the project sought to raise awareness and initiate a debate among and between scientists and policy-makers about the possible “dark sides” of future technologies.

Technology Scanning

The FESTOS team carried out a horizon scanning of emerging technologies that might pose security threats in the future if these technologies are abused. Furthermore, an assessment of the potential threats was carried out. The first result was a structured description of around 80 “potentially threatening” technologies in the six fields listed above. The next step was to evaluate the threat aspects of 33 selected technologies by means of an international expert survey in which 280 experts participated. The collection of technologies was not intended to be exhaustive but to stimulate further discussions and provide a basis for the subsequent analysis. As such, it can serve as a “dynamic data bank” of potentially “abusable” technologies.

Determining the Nature and Severity of Threats

Subsequently, the results of the expert survey were analysed in terms of the likely time spans for the threats to materialise, prioritisation (relative impact of each technology), the nature and extent of the potential damages, as well as societal issues. This activity included ranking and selecting security threats for scenario construction. In methodological terms, the exercise included expert brainstorming sessions, a security assessment (including Ansoff filters and the STEEPV method), an analysis of the relevant signals of change and wild cards.

Scenario Development

Four narrative scenarios based on the identified security threats from emerging technologies were developed. The aim of the scenarios was to depict possible futures that take into account the social dimension and the interdependency of different impacts. In a scenario workshop, five methods and procedures were used: wild cards, security climates, futures wheel, security café for impact analysis and brainstorming.

Control and Prevention

The possible control of scientific knowledge to prevent unintended new security threats is a very sensitive issue in open democratic societies. FESTOS raised a debate on whether and how to control emerging science and technology developments in order to prevent abuse without slowing down the process of knowledge creation needed for innovation, progress and improving human life. Secondly, FESTOS analysed the problematic issue of controlled dissemination of scientific knowledge in the light of the inevitable trade-offs between security and freedom of research and knowledge creation. The methods used were an online survey of approximately 100 selected experts and representatives from various parts of society, followed by 5-10 semi structured in-depth interviews in each of the participating countries (Poland, Germany, Finland, UK and Israel) with selected key actors representing civil society and other relevant organisations, and, finally, an international workshop on control and prevention, with the participation of invited experts and representatives.

 

 Top Technology Threats and Threat Scenarios

Three Types of Potential Threats

Examination of the diverse technologies led to identifying three broad categories of potential threats: The first category is the disruption of certain technological applications for malicious purposes (for example, jamming communications in intelligent collision avoidance systems in transportation). The second category concerns the increased availability of technologies that once were confined to the military or to unique, heavily funded laboratories and were prohibitively expensive. The third category concerns surprising malicious uses of new technologies developed for completely different, beneficial and civilian purposes. The most interesting for FESTOS seemed to be the third category, where we found the most unexpected threats, signals of change or surprising “wild cards”.

Ten New Top Priority Threats

The threat analysis resulted in a prioritisation of the threatening technologies with respect to their potential for malicious use (combining the easiness of putting them to malicious use and the severity of the threat). The resulting top ten technologies are:

  1. Smart mobile phone mash-ups
  2. Internet of things (IoT)
  3. Cloud computing
  4. New gene transfer technologies
  5. Advanced artificial intelligence
  6. Synthetic biology
  7. Cyborg insects
  8. Energetic nanomaterials
  9. Radio-frequency identification (RFID)
  10. Autonomous & semi-autonomous mini robots

Furthermore, the intensity of the potential threat (i.e. the overall threat to several spheres of society according to the experts) posed by the ten most relevant technologies was prioritised:

  1. Advanced artificial intelligence
  2. Human enhancement
  3. Swarm robotics
  4. Cyborg insects
  5. Internet of things (IoT)
  6. Water-catalysing explosive reactions
  7. Future fuels and materials for nuclear technologies
  8. AI-based robot-human interaction
  9. Cloud computing
  10. Programmable matter

For the time scale 2015 – 2020, the following potential “wild card technologies” were identified (i.e. technologies with high severity threats and a low likelihood of actual abuse): swarm robotics, brain implants, water-catalysing explosive reactions, future fuels, self-replicating nano-assemblers, medical nano-robots, ultra-dense data storage, meta-materials with negative light refraction index and synthetic biology.

Four Scenarios for Threat Assessment

Four narrative scenarios for threat assessment and identification of indicators were produced:

Scenario 1: Cyber-insects Attack!

Swarms of cyber-insects attack people and animals.

Scenario 2: The Genetic Blackmailers

Individual DNA is misused for purposes of extortion.

Scenario 3: At the Flea Market

Intelligent everyday nanotechnology-based products can be set to self-destruct, which is triggered by a wireless signal.

Scenario 4: We’ll Change Your Mind…

A terrorist group uses a virus to change the behaviour of a portion of the population for a certain period of time.

Conflict between Security and Freedom of Research

With the aid of the expert survey and the interviews, the FESTOS team assessed the respondents’ perceptions of the awareness, acceptance and effectiveness of control and prevention measures. The results show that control and prevention measures exist, mostly in the fields of ICT and biotechnology. On the basis of the national reports on the participating countries’ security institutions, we can say that the main institutions engaged in control activities are governments, ministries and security agencies. Most of the control measures have a high or very high impact on scientific knowledge, especially the freedom of science, knowledge creation and dissemination. The experts consider media, including the Internet, to be a dangerous channel of dissemination. By contrast, the most accepted control measures are

  1. education curricula including programmes aiming to raise the awareness of potential threats,
  2. measures invented by the knowledge producer and
  3. measures developed by the media to limit the publication of sensitive knowledge.

Codes of conduct, internal guidelines (bottom-up approach) and legal regulations are perceived as the most effective control measures.

 

Policy Conclusions

Continuation of Horizon Scanning of Emerging Technologies

There is a need for networking, international cooperation and broader expert panels to evaluate emerging technologies continuously with respect to possible unintended effects relevant to security. More detailed technological evaluations are required in the short-term, and it was suggested that at least sixty to eighty technologies need to be evaluated. FESTOS provides a starting point to cover all the risks and work towards a EU risk strategy in different areas of science and technology. In addition, there is a need to cooperate much closer with the EU patent office and with patent agencies around the world. It is furthermore very important to secure financing in Horizon2020 to allow continuing the horizon scanning work carried out in FESTOS.

Academic Freedom in Democratic Societies and “Knowledge Control”

There is a tension between possible security dangers of technology R&D and academic freedom, and there seem to be only two “stronger” control measures that academics are willing to accept: internal guidelines in research organisations and codes of conduct. Codes of conduct are the preferred control mechanism in R&D.

Ethical Control and Codes of Conduct

Since science and technology is globalised and develops at a fast pace, we can only have ethical control if there are international codes of conduct, to be developed by international organisations. Scientists need to understand the consequences of their research, and this needs to be handled at an international level. There seems to be a difference between democratic and non-democratic countries in this respect. In democratic countries, there is less of a threat that scientists might develop technologies that will be misused. In societies that are more closed and lack democratic institutions, scientists tend to continue their research even if they are aware that their invention might pose a threat to security. In any event, industry has a massive influence, including the ability to effectively lobby for its interests. Some of could focus on safe researcher practices, codes of conduct etc. and assist in the creation of an international “control” environment.

Project Assessment, Social Responsibility and Security by Design

It is highly desirable that the “dark side” is considered at the beginning of projects. Therefore, it is crucial to develop assessment criteria. It is more effective to build in design control measures during the design phases of the research than to turn to ethical assessment after the research is completed. Such an anticipatory approach results in “security by design”.

Networking: the Role of the State and the EU

Another critical element is “networking and networks”, which will be very important in the future. This aspect concerns how scientific organisations are networked to produce results for society. All innovations are based on knowledge, and we must develop knowledge-management systems to manage the dark sides as well. This requires an active role of the EU Commission and European Parliament.

The Role of Education

There is a need to educate students as early as possible about threats and security issues during their studies at university. Knowledge about these control dilemmas should be added to the universities’ curricula.

We also need early media training for children since they will encounter a number of challenges as they increasingly navigate an expanding digital universe. Such media proficiency is even more important since the digital universe can be unfamiliar or even unknown to their parents, who are “digital immigrants”.  The future “digital natives” can only cope and shape the digital universe if they are properly informed and know how to protect themselves.

Bottom-up vs. Top-down Approaches of Control

Actors and decision-makers, as they balance security needs, the requirements set by open democratic societies and the freedom of science, should take active measures against the possible dangers of the dark side of technologies. More promising than top-down measures are bottom-up proposals: Instead of legislation and coercive measures with rather questionable outcomes, the FESTOS team proposes to develop soft and optional measures. These measures, first of all, are based on self-regulation, self-control and the education of engineers and scientists. Codes of conduct, ethical guidelines and educational measures may initially be established on sub-state levels but must be developed into national, Europe-wide and global regimes. While self-regulation and education may be the means of choice in most cases, it has to be stressed that there are also exceptional cases, such as weapons of mass destruction, for instance. In these cases, there exist international regimes to regulate the prohibition of research and development of extremely dangerous technologies and, for the most part, the international community complies with the rules. An example is the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production of an entire category of weapons.

FESTOS Consortium

The consortium of the project “Foresight of Evolving Security Threats Posed by Emerging Technologies” (FESTOS) consists of the following partners:

Interdisciplinary Centre for Technology Analysis and Forecasting (ICTAF) at Tel-Aviv University, Israel

Finland Futures Research Centre (FFRC), University of Turku, Finland

Centre for Technology and Society, Technical University of Berlin (TUB), Germany

Institute of Sociology (IS), University of Lodz, Poland

EFP Consulting (UK) Ltd, UK

Authors: Burkhard Auffermann    Burkhard.Auffermann@utu.fi

Aharon Hauptman         haupt@post.tau.ac.il

Sponsors: European Union DG Research
Type: European Union foresight
Organizer: ICTAF – Interdisciplinary Center for Technology Analysis and Forecasting,                                             Coordinator: Dr. Yair Sharan, sharany@post.tau.ac.il
Duration: 2009 – 2011
Budget: € 824,552
Time Horizon: 2035
Date of Brief: February

Download: EFP-Brief-No.-225-FESTOS

Sources and References

http://www.festos.org/

 

EFP Brief. No. 214: Foresight Security Scenarios: Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to Exogenous EU Roles (FOCUS)

Friday, May 25th, 2012

FOCUS helps shape European security research to enable the EU to effectively respond to tomorrow’s challenges stemming from the globalisation of risks, threats and vulnerabilities. FOCUS concentrates on alternative future EU roles to prevent or respond to incidents situated on the ‘borderline’ between the internal and external dimensions of the security affecting the Union and its citizens. It does so by elaborating multiple scenarios, based on IT-supported foresight, in the form of alternative futures. These are plausibility-probed versus mere threat scenarios.

Foreseeing Exogenous Roles of the ‘EU 2035’ as a Comprehensive Security Provider to its Citizens

Through extrapolating the member states’ prerogative over security on the national scale, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) introduced the concept of the security of the European Union (EU) itself: Based on its new legal personality, the Union now aims ‘to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’ (Article 3 Treaty on European Union). For the security of the Union and its citizens, it is the Union that ‘shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation’ (Article 21).

The Lisbon Treaty makes a quantum transition towards harmonisation in the field of civil protection against natural or man-made disasters: The Union ‘shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States’ (Article 196 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).

The Treaty on European Union clearly establishes the Union as a whole as a security provider to its citizens, reaffirming its role as a global actor: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens’ (Article 3 Treaty on European Union).

Still mirroring the pre-Lisbon Treaty state of play, current practice of security research development in Europe is characterised by national focuses on a limited number of pre-defined missions or parallel scenarios that typically result from an analysis of specific national incidents, requirements or shortcomings. By contrast, FOCUS elaborates foresight-generated multiple scenarios in the form of alternative future tracks of security research topics, approaches and structures to introduce scenario planning from a European perspective and broaden the concept of security research.

The main idea of FOCUS is to develop multiple scenarios that function as common denominators for challenges (involving new tasks) whose causes are external to the territory of the Union, but whose consequences will be experienced on the territory of the Union and EU responses using tangible contributions from security research.

The work of FOCUS assists the EU, its member states, industry and other stakeholders to design a common approach to the contribution of security research to effectively cope with challenges arising from the globalisation of risks, threats and vulnerabilities before they deplete the EU’s ethical and societal legitimacy as a comprehensive security provider for its citizens.

FOCUS Objectives

FOCUS identifies and assesses alternative sets of future tracks for security research in FP7 and subsequent programmes that support the EU to adopt new roles in dealing with external threats, risks and vulnerabilities. The main contribution of the FOCUS project is the development of effective long-term prediction and assessment tools at the EU level.

Overall, FOCUS achieves the following six objectives, building upon each other:

  • Identify alternative sets of future tracks for security research in FP7 and subsequent programmes, supporting EU roles to deal with exogenous threats, risks and vulnerabilities.
  • Elaborate on the concept of transversality in assessing evolving needs for research across traditional disciplines, presently defined mission areas and throughout the security continuum.
  • Design and apply a specific scenario approach (‘embedded scenarios’). Base it on foresight to ensure openness, participation and inclusiveness (e.g. involvement of societal stakeholders), explicitly addressing security perceptions and security in relation to other values.
  • Produce an IT information infrastructure (by adapting existing information technologies) that will make material and tools for scenario planning of security research available to knowledge communities.
  • Enhance transparency, improve understanding and increase preparedness for the emerging challenges of the ‘external dimension’ and the ‘external-internal continuum’ of security and the evolution of security research.
  • Contribute to the planning of security research beyond the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) and European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), based on foreseen EU roles rather than on pre-defined missions.

FOCUS Scenario Level

FOCUS scenarios are on the level of strategic forward thinking ‘on hold’, to increase the ability to cope with alternative futures in the world of 2035. The scenarios neither predict the future, nor do they state normative desired futures or ‘wishful thinking’. They represent the results of the multiple foresights conducted by FOCUS. The level of application of the scenarios is strategic EU roles and strategic levels of research planning. According to the task at hand, the scenarios do not address end-user (such as first responder) postures with a view to specific crisis management missions.

However, FOCUS comprises the exploration of its scenarios foresight approach and products, including the IT-based Knowledge Management Platform, for possible use beyond the immediate scope of the project, thus addressing, end-user posture scenarios.

FOCUS Method

FOCUS conducts foresight on an inclusive basis, making maximum use of its IT support in order to integrate multiple stakeholders, experts from a broad range of fields and the interested public to address security in relation to other societal as well as ethical values. This approach is especially important in the context of scenario planning in order to ensure that the selected policies and security technologies are responsive to the needs of citizens and that they create security approaches rooted in acceptance. FOCUS designs and applies an ‘embedded scenario’ method of integration. This delineates options for future tracks and broadened concepts of security research within broader scenarios that involve EU roles for responding to transversal challenges (whose causes are external but whose effects are internal to the EU).

This task is performed along the following five big themes as derived from environmental scanning and research done in preparation of the project:

  • Comprehensive approach: Alternative future tracks in further developing the comprehensive approach as followed by institutions and states, including links between the internal and external dimension of security.
  • Natural disasters and global environmental change: Scenarios for future EU roles in preparing for and responding to natural disasters and environment-related hazards, focused on comprehensive crisis management.
  • Critical infrastructure and supply chain protection: Scenarios for future EU roles centred on preventing, mitigating and responding to exogenous threats that could have a significant impact on EU citizens.
  • EU as a global actor: Alternative futures of the EU as a global actor based on the ‘wider Petersberg Tasks’, building on EU and member states instruments and capability processes.
  • EU internal framework: Scenarios for the evolution of the EU’s internal framework and prerequisites for delivering a comprehensive approach, including Lisbon treaty provisions and relevant strategies (e.g. for engagement with other international actors) as well as ethical acceptability and public acceptance.

Problem Space Descriptions for FOCUS’ Five Big Themes: EU Challenge 2035

FOCUS foresight is informed by problem space descriptions developed for each of the five big themes, also taking into account results of foresight work conducted in other European and international projects. The problem space descriptions also contain initial results of foresight, in the form of main challenges for future EU roles and supporting security research.

Comprehensive Approach

A comprehensive approach aims at overarching solutions to problems, with broad effects and based on complementarity of actors, while considering all available options and capabilities as well as the normative end-state of the security of society as a whole. A comprehensive approach also entails the tackling of crosscutting issues in home affairs, including civil protection. Challenges in the coming decades will continue to be fraught with uncertainty, involving state and non-state actors combining conventional and asymmetric methods. Cyber threats will also proliferate, with possible capabilities to organise a high-consequence attack against European critical infrastructures. Future research should include an emphasis on the advancement and integration of approaches to foresight, with special consideration of disruptors from normative (desired) end-states. It should also focus on the implementation perspective, with indicators for measuring the effectiveness of the comprehensive approach.

Natural Disasters & Global Environmental Change

Addressing natural hazards, with serious consequences on a regional level, FOCUS centres on major external threats to greater areas (outside and within the European Union) that may shape future roles of the EU as a comprehensive security provider: They can cause humanitarian crises of scales requiring a wide spectrum of responses, as they affect infrastructures and the human environment. Interactions of different hazards, multi-hazards, technological hazards, and the fact that human activity can initiate or influence processes and events will play an increasing role. Future research should act as a catalyst, integrating results from projects on natural hazards and their security aspects. However, this would require enhanced accessibility of previous studies and their results. Improved dissemination strategies will be required. Other topics could be anthropogenic (or ‘man-made’) natural disasters and multi-disciplinary scenarios of maximum credible natural events.

Critical Infrastructure & Supply Chain Protection

The most significant advancement on the EU level has been the introduction of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). EPCIP embraces an all-hazards approach, also covering natural disasters and intentional man-made hazards. Effective protection will need binding international and global rules since major infrastructures operate internationally or globally and threats can originate from any place in the world. Policy developments call for support by well-focused EU-level research along three main themes: First, a detailed assessment of interdependencies in the European Critical Infrastructure system, including dependencies on critical infrastructure in third countries; second, a catalogue of critical supplies for the European economy, along with factors that could disrupt supply; third, analyses of how the new mandate from the Lisbon Treaty together with enhanced civilian and dual-use capabilities could change the Union’s role, including interests to protect supplies from the third countries.

The EU as a Global Actor Based on the Wider Petersberg Tasks

The 2008 implementation review of the European Security Strategy (2003) stressed that the Union now disposed of an unmatched repertory of instruments and activities to foster human security and address underlying causes of insecurity and conflict. Based on this, the EU should contribute to renewing multilateralism at the global level. Instruments of EU global roles may include increased justice and law enforcement capabilities; increased EU intelligence and early warning capabilities; financial instruments for influencing economic developments on a global scale; good governance and institution building, including security sectors; or civil society-related and cultural instruments, including media, social networks, etc.

EU Internal Framework

Some of the EU’s vulnerabilities result from the fact that European strategies sometimes do not take into account lacking resources required for their implementation and do not fully consider organisational needs to effectuate awareness and increase resilience. While EU member states agreed on introducing the concept of the security of the Union as a whole into the Lisbon Treaty, both the political and the public sector vary considerably across countries in their perceptions and concepts of security. The concept of security in the EU so far has been the result of Union-level initiatives and national repertories of action. Member states continue to rely on distinguished symbols of what they value and safeguard. There are different public and citizen security cultures, which usually lead to clearly nationally informed priorities. Divergences of such kind notwithstanding, the future concept of security and security research can be expected to be informed by the European Security Model as outlined in the EU Internal Security Strategy. This includes addressing the causes of insecurity and not just its effects, with priorities on prevention across sectors (political, economic, social, etc.).

Towards a FOCUS Roadmap

FOCUS has so far identified the following seven cross-thematic key drivers for future challenges to the EU as a comprehensive civil security provider:

  • Globalisation and international system change
  • Changing modes of governance
  • Changing values and norms
  • Economic and social change
  • Technological change
  • Extent of common threat assessment
  • Consistency and coherence of future security research

Based on the problem space descriptions and the topical and cross-theme drivers identified, FOCUS will now perform in-depth foresight processes. At first, sets of EU roles per big theme will be developed in the form of context scenarios. Following on from this, alternative futures for security research in support of these roles will be constructed and further analysed. This will, among other things, result in a FOCUS roadmap proposal for the planning of future security research within the “Horizon 2020” framework.

FOCUS also establishes working relations with other foresight projects within and outside the EU, such as the ‘Strategic Foresight Initiative’ (SFI) of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Authors: Alexander Siedschlag                    siedschlag@european-security.info

Andrea Jerković                              jerkovic@european-security.info

Sponsors: European Commission, Directorate General Enterprise and Industry

Research Executive Agency (REA)

Type: 7th EU Framework Programme Security Research project
Organizer: CEUSS | Center for European Security Studies, Sigmund Freud University Vienna
Duration: 2011-2013 Budget: 4.2 m € Time Horizon: 2035 Date of Brief: Mar 2012  

 

Download EFP Brief No. 214_Foresight Security Scenarios

Sources and References

Studies

Summary of FOCUS problem space descriptions, http://www.focusproject.eu/documents/14976/5babb39b-d63c-4288-b7a6-ae321c0ef638

FOCUS Deliverable 2.1: Report describing and defining the methodology, http://www.focusproject.eu/documents/14976/aa0eb75f-a43a-4044-ad26-387bc68cc586

FOCUS Deliverable 3.2: Alternative futures of the comprehensive approach, http://www.focusproject.eu/documents/14976/e3fe4a14-e7f6-4a98-9e66-70d5f1e4a028

Weblinks

FOCUS project website: http://www.focusproject.eu

FOCUS Facebook page: http://www.facebook.com/focus.fp7

FUSER group on Xing: https://www.xing.com/net/fuser

EFP Brief 199: SANDERA – The Future Impact of Security and Defence Policies on the European Research Area

Tuesday, October 18th, 2011

SANDERA (The Future Impact of Security and Defence Policies on the European Research Area) explored the future relationship between two critical policy domains: namely, the EU strategy to move towards the European Research Area (ERA) and those EU policies focused on the security of the European citizen in the world. More particularly, SANDERA investigated the possible future relationship between the ERA and defence research and innovation policy.

How Can We Reduce Urban Resource Consumption?

In Sustainable Urban Metabolism for Europe (SUME), the concept of urban metabolism is explicitly applied to the organisation of space for the first time, demonstrating the impact of urban form on resource flows by analysing the spatial distri­bution of population and jobs, the transport system and urban building technology. This is per­formed in a long-term scenario approach, projecting the urban development perspectives of seven European urban agglomerations. For four of these agglomerations, a spatially explicit metabolism model has been developed and applied.

Urban forms have evolved throughout history and can be changed substantial­ly only over longer periods and/or through dynamic restructuring. In search of opportunities to reduce urban resource consumption, the SUME project estimates the potential for transforming urban building and spatial structures by 2050 by applying alternative spatial development pol­icies for a given demographic and economic development path. Urban agglomerations in Europe show extremely different spatial patterns: some are com­pact and confined; many are fragmented and spread out. Urban transport systems are of very different qualities: some featuring attractive, well-integrated public transport provision while others strongly rely on individual transport. Technical building standards also vary widely, often depending on the period of construction, and add to the resource impact of a wide range of climatic conditions. All these differences are included in the term ‘urban form’ as it is used here.

Approach 1: The given urban form, in all its variations, is taken as a starting point for long-term urban development scenarios by 2050 in order to analyse the future potential of resource-effi­cient transformation. Demographic and economic development dynamics are, of course, the main parameters influencing the potential to change a given urban form.

Approach 2: The spatial urban metabolism model allows for systematic simula­tions of the functional relations between socio-economic developments and their consequences on the urban metabolism.

Approach 3: Since cities are built step-by-step, with larger or smaller develop­ment projects changing the existing structures, it is important to understand the projects’ individual contributions to the improvement of the overall performance of a city/agglomeration in terms of resource consumption. The Metabolic Im­pact Assessment (MIA) is a novel methodology to evaluate the effect of proposed urban deve­lopment projects on the metabolism of a city. It is a decision-support tool geared toward analysing and understanding the complex metabolic consequences of new urban projects or urban plans, e.g. in terms of energy flows associated with the project, for heating, cooling and transport.

Approach 4: Urban agglomerations’ development processes are very complex. Many factors intersect to generate the spatial pattern that we see in the built environment today. Hence, the processes, actors and their respective rationales were under scrutiny in the SUME project as well. ‘Producers’ of the urban fabric, such as landowners, developers and investors, are im­portant players, but they are not the only actors who matter; ‘consumers’ are also crucial. This group in­cludes individuals and companies who use buildings and spaces in cities, not just the inhabi­tants of homes and offices, but also visitors to the city, whether for work, shopping or recreation.

SUME Principles for Resource-efficient Development

In the SUME project, two different storylines are at the core of the two urban development scenarios elaborated for seven cities: a baseline, the so called BASE scenario, understood as a continuation of the urban develop­ment policies supporting past spatial development trends; and a SUME scenario, defined as a path of sustainable spatial development. The ‘scope for action’ referred to in this project involves the choice between these two scenarios, meaning whether or not the SUME principles are applied in urban development over an extended period. The SUME scenarios are geared toward improving urban resource efficiency and are guided by the so-called ‘four SUME princi­ples’ for future urban development:

  • Principle 1: Spatially focused densification

Promoting a minimum density standard for any new quarter and redevelopment of existing low-density quarters in areas with attractive, high-level public transport

  • Principle 2: High-density development only with access to high-quality public transport

Focusing new high-density developments exclusively in areas close to public transport networks (especially those with job and service functions)

  • Principle 3: Functional mix in urban quarters

Providing a mix of functions (i.e. residential, jobs and services) in close proximity to each other at the local level, allowing for short-distance access

  • Principle 4: Combination of urban and building (object) reconstruction

Improving the thermal quality of buildings and using the opportunity to improve the spatial qualities of urban quarters

It seems clear that the importance and potential impact of each of the four principles depends on the current urban form of the respective city. The varying range of potential future improve­ments in terms of land use and energy consumption is analysed in the subsequent case studies of cities presented below.

Increase in Space, Decrease in Economic Growth

Comparing the urban development scenarios shows that there is a great potential to influence urban form over time if a consistent set of policies is applied. The scenarios also display that the differential between the policy sets adds up and becomes resource-relevant over time.

The BASE scenarios show a substantial expansion of the so-called Urban Morphological Zones (UMZs)[1] for the fast growing cities, ranging from growth by 24% in AthensUMZ to 30% in MarseilleUMZ, 41% and 47% in MunichUMZ and StockholmUMZ to 54% in ViennaUMZ. These results are due to population increase, a proportional growth of jobs and a continuing increase in per capita floor space consumption. Based on empirical evi­dence of the past, it has been assumed here that the historical trend of floor space increase will continue in a stable eco­nomic development, but the per capita growth will slow down compared to past decades.

From this ‘baseline’ of expected development, the so-called SUME scenarios demonstrate a develop­ment path that should result in lower resource consumption (land use, energy, materials) and could be reasonably achieved through concerted urban development policy packages. SUME scenarios focus on inner-city development, high-level public transport axes and more compact development on the fringes of the existing UMZ.

[1] The continuously built-up area of an agglomeration, as defined by UN-Habitat (200 m maximum distance between buildings, based on the CORINE land-cover data).

The potential effects are substantial: the expan­sion of the agglomerations analysed can be avoided altogether in OportoUMZ and NewcastleUMZ, which is also due to their small demographic development, but also in dynamic cities such as AthensUMZ and MarseilleUMZ. The fastest growing agglomerations in the group are MunichUMZ, StockholmUMZ and ViennaUMZ where the expansion by 2050 could be reduced significantly to 13%, 20% and 14% respectively.

The results of the two spatial development scenarios for four of the cities were used as input for the spatially disaggregated modelling of energy flows based on the spatial distribution of jobs and residents, localisation of services and central functions, and fast lines of public transport.

Reducing Today’s Energy Demand

Table 1 gives an overview of the main results for the agglomeration aggregates for both the building and the transport model. It shows the final state of development in 2050 and compares the per capita energy demand figures for hea­ting and transport in the BASE and SUME scenarios. The main results show that today’s energy demand can be reduced by 60% to 80%, varying between cities and scenarios. In general, a SUME-scenario-type agglom­eration development will reduce energy consumption between 10% and 40% by the year 2050 compared to the BASE scenario.

The results demonstrate that, even in a future agglomeration development using all available technological improvements, there is a large differential between a BASE- and a SUME-type development: A higher replacement or renovation rate of buildings and a better spatial focus of new developments with respect to public transport accessibility will reduce energy con­sumption by 30 to 40%. Only in special situations like in Oporto, where relatively small changes are anticipated for both components, i.e. buildings and transport, will the differ­ential between the BASE and SUME scenarios be less than 10%.

In principle, Metabolic Impact Assessment (MIA) can be applied to different types of planning proposals: policies, programmes, plans and projects. However, within the scope of the SUME project, it was applied to detailed plans of large urban development projects. It has been recognised that at more strategic levels, MIA’s application will be more complex and demanding. At a local level, data is more easily identified and the analysis becomes more objective.

Within the general objective of SUME to analyse the impacts of urban form on resource use, the application of MIA has focused on specific components of urban metabolism, namely energy, land use, water and materials. Moreover, in each case study some limitations of data have caused further restrictions.

The four case studies in the European cities of Vienna, Stockholm, Oporto and Newcastle demonstrate the application of the new method: Metabolic Impact Assessment (MIA). The case studies show the impact of projects, compare them with the performance of alternative projects and of the relevant districts within the agglomeration. Applying MIA can lay the ground­work for improving planning proposals in key aspects of urban metabolism and also contri­bute to the necessary assessment of alternative locations for such projects within the urban fa­bric. MIA shows that it is essential to include the impacts of urban development projects regar­ding infrastructure needs and transport in the agglomeration context because a) unexpected effects in other sections of the complex transport network can be detected and b) underuse of existing infrastructure in certain districts can be determined. Both of these aspects potentially lead to substantial project modifications.

Guidelines for Developing New and Existing Quarters

To improve the metabolic performance of a city or agglomeration, urban spatial development strategies should focus on the application of the four SUME principles for developing new and rebuilding existing quarters. This would be an ongoing process with a clear strategic orienta­tion:

  • Containment at the level of agglomerations: reduce urban expansion to a min­imum, keep travel distances low, provide for good spatial access to public transport routes and attractive service there. Currently most growth happens in the spaces be­tween transport axes in areas out of reach of attractive public transport.
  • Spatially focused densification in low-density urban outskirts: this is a key strategy in growing cities to avoid expansion and improve transport service quality.
  • Locate services and offices at transport nodes and allow for a mix of functions at the neighbourhood level: the busiest nodes of agglomerations’ public transport systems are attractive for office and service space, and most advantageous for the location of jobs with excellent access to public transport. On a neighbourhood scale, it is also important to have a functional mix within each of the urban regions’ neighbourhoods to provide for services and access to daily supplies at short distances.
  • Improve agglomerations’ public transport systems: some urban regions have com­paratively high densities, but do not provide well-developed public transport systems – there exists a great potential for improvements, particularly at the agglomeration level.

Urban development policy packages need to be oriented towards the following:

  • All urban growth and the life-cycle turnover of built structures should be used as potential to improve the existing urban form, both in terms of spatial structures and object qualities. Urban growth in this sense is not an enemy to sustainable develop­ment but can be a partner in getting there.
  • Larger urban development projects can be located and serviced with infrastructure in such a way that they improve the overall performance of a whole area of a city/agglom­eration (see MIA).
  • At the level of users/developers, all ongoing relocation and renovation activities have the potential to improve urban form if location, building standards and functional distribution (residential, services, jobs) are taken into account constantly and systematically.
  • Renovation and building rehabilitation programmes for urban quarters should reach be­yond improving thermal qualities only, to include raising inner-city attrac­tiveness (green spaces, pedestrian/bicycle mobility, services) and putting metabolism-relevant technology in place (e.g. smart city initiatives, production of renewable energy).

In order to follow these strategic recommendations, it will be essential to develop a cross-sectoral approach in urban development, integrating urban planning, housing policies, energy policies, infrastructure provision and transport policies. Such integrated, coherent approaches for the development of new and existing urban quarters, however, are hardly found nowadays. This shortcoming presents the greatest challenge in restructuring European cities along sustainable and resource-efficient lines

Authors: Christof Schremmer                        schremmer@oir.at

Barbara Saringer-Bory                    saringer@oir.at

Ursula Mollay                                  mollay@oir.at

Sponsors: FP7 Collaborative Research Project; Area 6.2.1.5 – Urban development ENV.2007.2.1.5.1 – Urban metabolism and resource optimisation in the urban fabric, collaborative research project
Type: Single issue brief
Organizer: ÖIR, Austrian Institute for Regional Studies and Spatial Planning, Project coordinator, www.oir.at
Duration: 2008-2011 Budget: 3.6m € Time Horizon: 2050 Date of Brief: Mai 2012  

 

Download EFP Brief No. 199_SANDERA

Sources and References

For information and downloads on the SUME project and its findings, please visit: http://www.sume.at/

EFP Brief No. 159: ForeSec: Europe’s Evolving Security

Tuesday, May 24th, 2011

The objective of ForeSec is to tie together the multiple threads of existing work on the future of European security in an attempt to provide a more coherent guidance, orientation and structure to all future security-related research activities. It aims at enhancing the common understanding of the complex global and societal nature of European security in order to pre-empt novel threats and capture technological opportunities. The project takes a participatory approach in an attempt to facilitate the emergence of a coherent and ho-listic approach to current and future threats and challenges to European security. ForeSec builds a pan-European network around the European security foresight processes and helps foster a societal debate on European security and security research. As this brief is published, ForeSec still has a few months of project work lying ahead. Accordingly, all results presented here are merely intermediate.

EFMN Brief no. 159_ForeSec

EFP Brief No. 155: A Roadmap for the Commercial Development of Medicinal Plants of the Andean Region of South America

Tuesday, May 24th, 2011

The main objective of the project was to establish a future vision (2020) and define the best means for the production, commercialization and innovation of products on the basis of medicinal plants of the Andean region of South America that would contribute to its social and economic development.

EFMN Brief No. 155_Andean Medicinal Plants

EFP Brief No. 151: Furniture Foresight Centre – CEFFOR®

Tuesday, May 24th, 2011

CEFFOR was created to promote the sustainable development (in terms of all three pillars: economic, social and environmental) of the
furniture industry in countries with high costs of production. CEFFOR is to accomplish this task by means of contributing strategic
information to the social agents and companies who participate in determining enterprise strategies and industry policies.

EFMN Brief No. 151_Furniture Foresight Centre

EFP Brief No. 149: EU-Africa Energy Partnership: Implications for Biofuel Use

Sunday, May 22nd, 2011

This brief intends to provide an overview of the rationale underlying the EU-Africa Energy Partnership, in addition to an analysis of the potential implications of this policy on the development of sub-Saharan African nations. It is posited that the partnership could have potentially negative repercussions if critical uncertainties are not sufficiently taken into account, and that it is in the EU’s best interest to ensure that outcomes are genuinely equitable. The research also has implications for other developing nations around the world seeking to further their economies and raise living standards by means of engaging in the global biofuels industry.

Europe, Energy Security and Biofuels

It is widely acknowledged that the energy security of the EU, as a whole, is deficient with respect to meeting future energy requirements. At the same time, the EU has resolved to de-crease its carbon footprint and wean itself off from environ-mentally damaging fossil fuels. A further concern is that even if the developed world manages to arrest the proliferation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions the developing world will still continue to pollute.
To address these important issues, the EU has developed the EU-Africa Energy Partnership. The rationale, broadly speak-ing, is twofold:

  • Secure the EU’s energy supply and allow its member states to meet challenging emissions reduction targets.
  • Provide sub-Saharan African economies with a further export market, in addition to allowing these nations to leapfrog to lower-emissions technologies.

Although the partnership deals with renewable energy in its broadest sense, there appears to be great emphasis on the cul-tivation of biomass used in the production of renewable fuels such as ethanol and biodiesel, for which there is increasing demand within the EU. Despite the ostensibly sound intentions of the policy, it remains to be seen whether the energy partner-ship will truly be mutually beneficial.
The aim of this brief is to examine the critical uncertainties that could potentially damage the workability and equitability of the energy partnership. A key consideration, here, is that the partnership has seemingly been formulated under ceteris pari-bus conditions. Thus, the partnership’s success is predicated on the continuation of existing trends, such as growth in bio-fuel demand and the ability to cultivate biomass at market-friendly prices in the future. Yet, the increasing complexity of technological systems, the advent and potential adoption of new technologies, in addition to climate change, means that it cannot be assumed that all things will indeed remain equal.

EU Biofuel Policy

The EU has set targets for biofuel usage within the member states. Policy measures designed to stimulate biofuel use were introduced in 1992. The overall aim has been to reduce the cost of biofuels in comparison with conventional petroleum products, which otherwise would be higher given the produc-tion costs and economic risk associated with fluctuations in oil price and the value of biomass-derived by-products (Cadenas and Cabezudo, 1998).
The EU Commission set a political target of substituting 20 percent of conventional biofuels by 2020 (European Commis-sion, 2001, p. 45). The even more ambitious COM(2006)845 proposed that biofuel targets for transport fuel should be 20 percent for the same year. The EU Biofuels Directive (2003/30/EEC) requires member states to ensure that a mini-mum proportion of fuels sold are biofuels (see Faaij, 2006). The aim is to ensure that 5.75% of conventional fuels are re-placed by biofuels, although the Biomass Action Plan (BAP) has concluded that these targets will not be reached (Commis-sion of the European Communities, 2006, p. 6).
There is thus a growing requirement for biofuel production within the EU and indeed a growing demand for biofuels (es-pecially biodiesel). Since the EU member states do not have the capacity to increase biomass cultivation without causing an increase in food prices (a politically unpalatable outcome), it has been deemed necessary to look for alternative ways to satisfy this demand.

Energy Partnership

In this context, the EU-Africa Energy Partnership emerges as an important component of the EU’s aim to increase the use of bio-fuels for transport within the member states, thereby allowing the EU to meet challenging biofuel targets, contribute to global GHG mitigation strategies (such as Kyoto), and address concerns regarding energy security. The partnership is argued to be mutually beneficial, since it will also promote economic and social improvement in sub-Saharan African countries and allow such nations to switch to more environmentally friendly patterns of energy use.
The partnership is intended to promote greater interconnectiv-ity between energy systems and ensure a diversity of energy options (Commission of the European Communities, 2006, p. 15). Although there is reference to alternative energy sources, such as hydropower (ibid.), there is clearly an emphasis on greater biomass cultivation and biofuel production, perhaps to the detriment of other energy solutions.
Energy security is obviously an important component of the partnership. Sub-Saharan Africa thus has the ability to sup-plement volatile supplies (and pricing) of OPEC oil with bio-mass cultivated in the region. Although the sub-Saharan re-gion is also clearly not especially stable, it at least has the ca-pacity to offset some of the risk associated with dealing with OPEC countries.

Production Processes

Given the current high cost of second-generation biofuel pro-duction processes (which use the whole organic matter as a feedstock), it can be assumed that the bulk of the biofuel feed-stocks grown in sub-Saharan Africa would be used in arguably inefficient first-generation production processes. Here, only the sugars and starches (rather than the whole plant) are used for ethanol production, while only the extracted vegetable oil is used in biodiesel production (Charles et al., 2007).

Critical Uncertainties

It is necessary to look at the critical uncertainties that could impact on the success of the EU-Africa Energy Partnership.

Climate Change

The energy partnership, in as much as it relates to promoting sub-Saharan Africa as a source of biofuel feedstock, assumes that current climatic conditions will prevail. Yet climate change could mean that climatic conditions in areas currently suitable for agricultural endeavour might militate against prof-itable biomass cultivation.
There are a number of critical factors associated with climate change that need to be taken into account:

  • Increased uncertainty with regard to rainfall patterns: This will problematize when to plant and place pressure on water use, with potential social repercussions.
  • Increased and more severe meteorological phenomena: Floods could wipe out entire fields; storms could damage or destroy harvests, while uncontrolled fires (resulting from co-factors of drought, thunderstorm activity or hu-man action) could do likewise.
  • Increased incidence and severity of pestilence: Changed climatic conditions could make crops more susceptible to pests, thereby increasing the need to employ pesticides (with cost penalties and potential impact on the local envi-ronment and human health).

These factors, when taken together, suggest that it will be more difficult to plan for weather-related phenomena into the future. Thus, claims of increased energy security within the EU resulting from the partnership need to be tempered with the realization that traditional agricultural techniques do not guarantee constant and predictable harvests, while climate change may exacerbate uncertainty.

Environmental Impacts

Agriculture has brought about widespread environmental deg-radation around the world. Thus, it is important to bear in mind the potentially negative impacts that intensified farming practices will have on ecosystems in sub-Saharan nations, in addition to the region as a whole.
The possible factors that could lead to negative environmental impacts are as follows:

  • Increased use of fertilizers: Run-off from fertilizers in-creases the incidence of algal bloom in aquatic environ-ments; fertilizers lead to an increased level of atmospheric N2O harmful to the ozone layer; and fertilizer production and distribution is energy inefficient and contributes to greenhouse gas proliferation.
  • Increased use of pesticides: Pesticide run-off pollutes local watercourses, results in a loss of biodiversity when food supplies for higher organisms are reduced, can flow throughout food-chains, thereby leading to chemical build-up in higher organisms, especially avian fauna; pro-duction processes and distribution incur GHG penalties, can be harmful to human life and can contaminate water supplies (of particular importance in developing nations).
  • Increased threat of deforestation: Expanding biofuel mar-kets may prompt changes in land-use, potentially leading to deforestation, entailing significant biodiversity and CO2 penalties.

These factors could be aggravated if a greater demand for bio-fuels in the EU member states is occasioned and if changing weather patterns result in a need to ‘make hay while the sun shines’. Such a demand could effectively see the EU exporting local environmental degradation from its member states to sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental degradation could also lead to opportunity costs resulting from a loss of potential eco-tourism income.

Technological Change

Biofuels, at best, will be an important component in a future energy mix. There are no indications that biofuels will ever replace petroleum-derived products on a one-for-one basis (Di Lucia and Nilsson, 2007). Biofuels enjoy a clear advantage over other potential energy solutions, especially since they take advantage of existing infrastructural systems (Foresight Vehicle, 2004). This ensures that switching costs are reduced.
On the other hand, there is the threat that biofuels will be ren-dered redundant by other technologies. There is much evi-dence throughout history to suggest that over-reliance on a single natural resource for a nation’s prosperity is not sustain-able over the long-term. For example, Chile, which prospered on the basis of its export of sodium nitrate (saltpetre), lost this advantage when scientists developed a synthetic alternative.
Some threats to the increasing importance of biofuels are as follows:

  • Increase in use of nuclear energy (and thus ‘clean’ elec-tricity).
  • Switch to cleaner second- (and third-) generation biofuel production processes.
  • Development of a hydrogen economy (predicated on the availability of clean, renewable energy, such as from the sources listed below).
  • Other energy paradigms, for instance, geothermal, hy-droelectric, photovoltaic, wind etc.

Thus, over-capitalization in biomass cultivation for first-generation production processes (in particular) may lead to un-sustainable increases in foreign debt, in addition to severe job losses and resultant social upheaval. In a worst case scenario, more efficient technologies, if they become widely adopted around the globe, could lead to the biofuel industry’s collapse.

Opportunity Costs

Even if the biofuel industry remains important, over-emphasis on biomass cultivation could result in a failure to develop in-dustries that have the potential to contribute greater value added to sub-Saharan African economies. This would espe-cially be the case if insufficient attention were paid to process-ing the feedstock in sub-Saharan Africa, as could occur in na-tions traditionally focussed on exporting natural resources.
Biomass cultivation, in the event of an ever-increasing de-mand for biofuels, would not merely translate into sub-Saharan African countries gaining an OPEC-like significance on the world stage. This is especially the case given a) the potentially wide dispersal of biomass cultivation and b) the high likelihood that biofuels would remain one of several al-ternative energy solutions. African biomass would also have to compete with that cultivated in North and South America, and also in South-East Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Given that these regions are already more highly industrialized than most sub-Saharan African nations, it is plausible that greater value added would occur in these regions.
There is also a danger that biomass cultivation in sub-Saharan Africa could engender an increased dependency on multi-national corporations involved in agribusiness. There are al-ready substantial links to agriculture in developing nations and the research-intensive products, including seeds, support sys-tems and expertise, being offered by multinational agribusi-ness entities.

Export Commodity Dependency

Sub-Saharan Africa has a long history of supplying European nations with raw materials to be used in value-adding produc-tion processes. There is thus the potential for this situation to continue if Europe resolves to view the region merely as source of inexpensive feedstock for biofuel production, rather than as a knowledge-intensive producer in its own right.
Many of the economic and social problems faced today in sub-Saharan Africa are deeply rooted in history. When the Euro-pean colonial powers partitioned Africa, they viewed the colo-nies as suppliers of raw materials for their factories. Farmland traditionally used for food cultivation, even after the inde-pendence of the former colonies, was turned over to cash crops such as cocoa, cotton, coffee and rubber. The result was that Africa exported what it did not need, and imported what it did, thereby leading to substantial trade deficits and continued indebtedness (Carmody, 1998). This is because the low price obtained for cash crops rarely if ever matches the relatively high price paid for imported food, in addition to luxury goods and hardware desired by affluent members of society.
It is important to be awake to the potential for ongoing com-modity dependence to occur, especially if the EU pays insuffi-cient attention to developing sub-Saharan Africa as an energy producer rather than merely an agricultural supplier.

Investing in Sub-Saharan Future

It is possible to formulate a number of potential policy impli-cations that would add rigour to the energy partnership.

  • Moving away from first-generation biofuels: A continued emphasis on first-generation biofuel production processes reinforces sub-Saharan Africa as a supplier of cash crops.There are inherent problems with first-generation biofuel production processes. A failure to address these and move demand towards more efficient second-generation proc-esses could lead to a global undermining of confidence in biofuels as a source of renewable energy.
  • Ensuring environmental sustainability: This is tied closely to the previous consideration, but also with the necessity of preventing local and regional environmental degrada-tion as a result of poor farming practices or indeed wide-spread change in land-use. There is a need to develop mechanisms to ensure that increasing demand for biofuels within the EU does not lead to catastrophic environmental impacts in sub-Saharan Africa.
  • Investing in sub-Saharan Africa’s future: The energy partnership should be used as a component in an overall strategy to enhance economic development in the region. A failure to do so will result in greater amounts of envi-ronmental degradation (including greenhouse gas emis-sions) over the long-term.

In short, the nations of the region need to acquire their own energy security and processing infrastructure. The EU-Africa Energy Partnership must serve as a vehicle to promote these ends. To achieve this end, sufficient political will over the long-term to propagate cleaner biofuel production processes is required. If not, the biofuels market could be irreparably com-promised and the partnership with it, with grave implications for not only the EU and sub-Saharan Africa, but also the planet as a whole.

 

Authors: Michael Charles michael.charles@scu.edu.au
Sponsors: Southern Cross University, Australia
Type: Single issue, energy policy
Organizer: n.a.
Duration: n.a.
Budget: n.a.
Time Horizon: 2018
Date of Brief: July 2008

Download: EFMN Brief No. 149_EU-Africa Energy Partnership

Sources and References

  •  Cadenas, A., and Cabezudo, S., 1998. Biofuels as sustain-able technologies: perspectives for less developed coun-tries. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 58(1–2), 83–103.
  • Carmody, P., 1998. Constructing alternatives to structural adjustment in Africa. Review of African Political Econ-omy 25(75), 25–46.
  • Charles, M.B., Ryan, R., Ryan, N., and Oloruntoba, R., 2007. Public policy and biofuels: the way forward? En-ergy Policy 35(11), 5737–5746.
  • Di Lucia, L., and Nilsson, L.J., 2007. Transport biofuels in the European Union: the state of play. Transport Policy 14(6), 533–543.
  • European Commision, 2001. Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for Security of Supply. Directorate-General for Transport and Energy.
    http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy-supply/doc/green_paper_energy_supply_en.pdf
  • European Commission, 2006. Communication from the Commission: An EU strategy for Biofuels—Impact As-sessment. Commission Staff Working Document COOM (2006) 34 final.
    http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/biomass/biofuel/sec2006_142_en.pdf
  • Faaij, A.P.C., 2006. Bio-energy in Europe: changing technology choices. Energy Policy 34(3), 322–342.
  • Foresight Vehicle, 2004. Foresight Vehicle Technology Roadmap: Technology and Research Directions for Fu-ture Road Vehicles, Version 2.0.
    http://www.foresightvehicle.org.uk/public/info_/FV/TRMV2.pdf